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THE STANDARDIZED AGREEMENT
PHENOMENA IN THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
John E. Murray, Jr t
OVERVIEW
The American Law Institute is committed to the self-evident truth
that Restatements of the law must be kept current.' It has produced six
completed revisions of Restatements of the law in less than a quarter
century and more are on the way.2 The most recent, completed revision
is the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. It is important to evaluate
this new version of the most revered Restatement of the law. The origi-
nal Restatement of Contracts was unique not only because it was the
first Restatement. It was largely the product of a contracts scholar who
had been elevated to oracular standing before the original Restatement
was completed. Inevitably, Professor Williston lent this Restatement of
the law a strong presumption of reliability. It was destined to be a clas-
sic Restatement and it achieved that destiny. Notwithstanding the com-
mitment to keep the Restatements current, how does one approach the
modernization of a classic? The Director of the American Law Institute
properly responds: with "respect and tenderness."' 3 The extent of
needed change cannot be known until the work of revision is underway.
What did the revisers discover? The official response is revealing:
As the work proceeded, it uncovered relatively little need for major
substantive revision . . . , although the Uniform Commercial Code
inspired a number of significant additions. The opportunities
presented for improving the black letter formulations involved pri-
marily the mode of presentation: matters of organization, where
changes in the ordering or scope of topics enhanced clarity or reduced
redundancy, and matters of drafting, where revision served the inter-
est of compression, simplification, precision or refinement of analysis.
No less significant than alterations of this order was the profound shift
in style inaugurated by Restatement, Second: the introduction of ex-
tensive commentary explaining and expounding the black letter; the
publication of Reporter's Notes canvassing the leading authoritative
t Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Elected mem-
ber, American Law Institute. B.S., 1955, LaSalle College; LL.B., 1958, Catholic University;
SJ.D., 1959, Wisconsin.
1 H. Wechsler, Foreword to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs at vii (1979).
2 Id
3 Id at viii.
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sources; the description and analysis of widespread statutory
development. 4
This characterization of the revision is in keeping with what one
would reasonably expect of the process of revising a classic work. Ab-
sent some statutory additions emanating primarily from the Uniform
Commercial Code, the official characterization suggests that there was
little need for substantive revision and that the primary opportunities
for improvement were in the mode of presentation. The only
"profound" change is one of "style." This view of the revision is difficult
to reconcile with the official conclusion: "It does not denigrate the 1932
volumes to say that the revisions and additions here presented greatly
augment their quality. This is, indeed, very close to a new work."5
How can a revision that does not involve any significant substan-
tive change (apart from necessary statutory "additions") and that con-
centrates on editorial functions such as organization, simplification, the
removal of redundancy, and stylistic modification be viewed as "greatly
augmenting" the quality of a classic to such an extent that it becomes
virtually a "new work"? This paradoxical description of the process and
results of the revision is some evidence of the impossible task that the
Reporters,6 their consultants, and the advisers faced. The inevitable
constraints under which they had to perform brings to mind the now
overused observation of Dr. Johnson: It is not remarkable that they
could not do it well; it is remarkable that they could do it at all. 7
Chief among the constraints was the reconciliation of Williston's
classical, monistic view of contract law, which allowed for a black-letter
approach with little comment, with Corbin's view that rules of law are
flexible and must take account of economic, social, moral, and ethical
considerations. It was, therefore, essential that there be a "profound
shift in style" through "the introduction of extensive commentary ex-
plaining and expounding the black letter."8 The new style is highly
reminiscent of the style of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code: when "an approach by statute . . . [is] dubious . . . and . . .
awkward,"9 the "official"' 0 comments are of critical importance.
4 Id
5 Id
6 Professor Robert Braucher of the Harvard Law School served as Reporter until 1971.
He was succeeded by Professor E. Allan Farnsworth of Columbia University School of Law,
who completed the project.
7 J. BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 327 (2d ed. 1953) ("It is not done well; but you are
surprised to find it done at all.").
8 H. Wechsler, supra note 1, at viii.
9 K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960).
10 Although many courts have have relied upon the Comments in construing and ap-
plying particular Code sections, they have not been enacted into law. Therefore, although
the Comments may be useful in determining what was intended by a particular Code section,
in case of any conflict between the Code language and a Comment, the Code must control.
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With the success of the Uniform Commercial Code, it was inevita-
ble that all contract law would be deeply influenced by that semi-per-
manent" piece of legislation, which insisted upon radical changes in
classical contract law. It would be impossible to construct a new Re-
statement absent a careful recognition of Llewellynesque leeways.' 2 Be-
cause the Code was co-sponsored by the American Law Institute 3 and
was designed to control all contracts for the sale of goods, the influence
of Llewellyn's radical views on our case law of offer and acceptance, as
well as on other issues traditionally considered under the rubric of con-
tract law, would have a significant effect on any meaningful new Re-
statement of Contracts.
Had anyone in the early sixties attempted to play the role of Willis-
ton, he or she would have failed. Williston was opposed to the enact-
ment of the UCC, 14 principally because the underlying philosophy of
Article Two and the express philosophy of Corbin favored pliable rules
of law that could be modified or even discarded when they did not work.
In Corbin's view, anything that sounded like a permanent rule was du-
bious. 15 And not only was Corbin a consultant to the new Restatement;
those charged with its creation were, necessarily, heavily "Corbinized"
before they assumed their new duties. Corbin was also much more toler-
ant than Williston of differences in case law.' 6
The case law that the Restatement Second drafters would have to con-
sider was itself heavily influenced by Corbin. Nor were other influential
voices in contract law to be ignored. The important work of Lon Fuller,
for example, undoubtedly influenced the thinking of the Reporter and
I1 U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1.
12 See Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of Which Karl N. Llewelyn i the Hero of the Piece; or
Searchingfor More Expansion Joints in Kars Crumbling Cathedral, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv.
139 (1970); Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl s New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of
our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REv. 213 (1966).
13 The American Law Institute is a voluntary organization composed of approximately
1,500 judges, law professors, and leading members of the Bar. In existence since 1923, the
Institute was organized for the purpose of improving the law and is known primarily for its
series of Restatements of the law on various subjects, including contracts, torts, agency, and
trusts.
In 1940 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a
proposal to prepare a uniform commercial code that would modernize and coordinate the
Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, and all other uniform acts existing on closely
related commercial problems. The American Law Institute joined in the undertaking the
following year, and the result, after many drafts and re-drafts, is the Uniform Commercial
Code.
14 Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV.
561 (1950).
15 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTrs § 3, at 7-8 (1963).
16 Id § 23, at 67-70.
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Advisers.1 7 Finally, there was the constraint of working in the shadow
of the first Restatement. To paraphrase the Director, it does not denigrate
the other Restatements to suggest that the Restatement of Contracts-
the singular, classic, original Restatement of the law-was, through the
sheer authority of Samuel Williston, in a special class.
The Reporters and Advisers are to be commended for their dili-
gence and patience in undertaking to produce a work which could not
possibly have the impact of its predecessor. Compromise and reconcilia-
tion of worthy views are high values in any Restatement of the law.
Absent the authority of Williston, however, and influenced by the phi-
losophy of Corbin, compromise and reconciliation became the apotheo-
sis of the Restatement Second The standard of "all things to all men,"
although dictated by the constraints, produced a Restatement Second that
will have even less influence than would a new Restatement. The attempt
to incorporate Corbin's views, while paying deference to Williston's,
may have resulted in a Restatement Second that neither scholar would have
preferred. One clear example of this result is found in the treatment of
the parol evidence rule where, to the detriment of courts and lawyers
who look to the Restatement for guidance, virtually every view appears to
be represented. 18 Again, lacking the authority of Williston and pursu-
ing the anti-dogmatic approach of Corbin, inevitably the drafters at-
tempted to reconcile the irreconcilable with results that may suggest
distinctions without differences.19
One of the most difficult tasks confronting the revisers was the inte-
gration of the new contract law of Article Two of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. Again, the official position of the American Law Institute
was that the Code "inspired a number of significant additions. '20 The
challenge was to assimilate into the fabric of general contract law the
sometimes radical changes embodied in a Code conceived to control
contracts for the sale of goods. The challenge was simultaneously an
opportunity to elaborate and to clarify the modifications of classical
contract law in Article Two. Such elaboration and clarification can be
extremely useful, particularly where a Code section manifests concep-
tual or drafting deficiencies. In isolated situations, the Restatement Second
succeeds admirably in elaborating and clarifying the operative effect of
a particular Code section.21 Unfortunately, the Restatement Second does
not meet this challenge or grasp this opportunity in the majority of in-
17 See, e.g., the Reporter's notes in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 50, 71,
73, 84, 87. See also the many other authorities cited in the Reporter's Notes.
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 213-217 (1979). See also Murray, The
farol Evidence Process and Standardzed Agreements under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 1342 (1975).
19 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 53, 130 (1979).
20 H. Wechsler, supra note 1, at viii.
21 Compare U.C.C. § 2-206 with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 30, 32
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stances in which the integration of Code concepts is essential. This Arti-
cle will examine these lost opportunities as exemplified by the Restatement
Second's treatment of standardized agreements 22 and the related subjects
of the nonmatching acceptance ("the battle of the forms") 23 and
unconscionability. 24
There may be no more perplexing current problems in contract law
than those emanating from the massive use of standardized, printed
("pad") forms to evidence the contract. Standard forms are probably
the evidence of the deal in up to ninety-nine percent of all contracts. 25
Allowing for some exaggeration, there can be no question that the over-
whelming majority of contracts made daily in the United States are evi-
denced by printed forms. Among the plethora of problems that this
development has created, the most difficult question can be stated
rather simply: Since virtually no one (consumer or merchant) bothers to
read the printed forms that are in regular use, is the non-drafting party
bound by all of the terms contained therein? Even for those who would
answer yes without hesitation, there must be exceptions.
One exception would reject those documents that cannot reason-
ably be viewed as contractual, e.g., receipts, parcel checks, invoices, and
the like.26 A second exception would nullify a printed form signed by
the non-drafting party under physical duress, fraud, or misrepresenta-
tion.27 But what of those forms the parties intend to be the evidence of
their contract although they neither read nor understand the entire
form? One response which the classical approach favors may be called
the flagellant view. This view binds the parties to the literal terms of the
printed form; if the non-drafting party later objects to a term on the
ground that he neither read nor understood it, he is told to live with the
consequences of his negligence in the hope that he will never sin again.
(1979). See also Murray, Contrads: A New Designfor the Agreement Process, 53 CORNELL L. REV.
785 (1968).
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 211 (1979).
23 Id § 59.
24 Id § 208.
25 Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 529, 529 (1971).
26 Culbreth v. Simone, 511 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (condition on money order did
not become term of contract); Birmingham Television Corp. v. Water Works, 292 Ala. 147,
290 So. 2d 636 (1974) (term on back of warehouse receipt not part of contract); Goldstein v.
Harris, 24 Ala. App. 3, 130 So. 313 (term on storage receipt for coat not binding on bailor),
cert. denied, 221 Ala. 612, 130 So. 315 (1930); Iowa-Missouri Walnut Co. v. Grahl, 237 Mo.
App. 1093, 170 S.W.2d 437 (1943) (term on back of check did not become part of contract);
Charles v. Charles, 478 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1972) (written statement on back of promissory note
not part of contract); Green's Ex'rs v. Smith, 146 Va. 442, 131 S.E. 846 (1926) (terms on
circulars enclosed with monthly bills under the contract did not become part of contract).
27 United States v. 1,557.28 Acres of Land, 486 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1973); Laemmar v. J.
Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1970); College Watercolor Group, Inc. v. Wil-
liam H. Newbauer, Inc., 468 Pa. 103, 360 A.2d 200 (1976); Allen-Parker Co. v. Lollis, 257
S.C. 266, 185 S.E.2d 739 (1971).
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This is the view of those who insist that certainty and stability are the
highest values in contract law. A child who touches the hot stove will be
careful to avoid a repetition of that painful experience. A party who
suffers a loss occasioned by a printed clause that he neither read nor
understood, however, undoubtedly will enter into subsequent contracts
evidenced by forms which he, again, will neither read nor understand.
For consumers and merchants, the pain and suffering of attempting to
read and understand every printed form would be greater than the pain
they suffer as a result of occasionally being bound by unread and un-
comprehended printed terms. After all, many contracts between
merchants may not be contracts at the time the printed forms are ex-
changed,28 but become contracts by conduct when the goods are
shipped and accepted. More often than not, nothing goes awry. The
exchange of printed clauses is, essentially, a waste of time. If lightning
strikes and one is bound by a bizarre, oppressive, or unexpected term, so
be it. The conclusion is inescapable: Merchants and consumers would
not undergo the great suffering necessitated by a perusal of printed
terms, even if time allowed-which, of course, it would not.
Because lawyers and judges deal with situations that go awry (the
"hospital" cases in Llewellynese), it is unsatisfactory to insist that some-
one should always be bound by printed terms that he neither read nor
understood, even if he would be willing, on balance, to assume such a
risk in lieu of being forced to peruse the printed terms of every contract
document that he encounters. The private law that a contract creates
will be recognized as legally binding only if it conforms to some rational
standard. The classic standard of contract enforceability is the manifes-
tation of volition or free choice-the essence of agreement. As Professor
Slawson suggests, "the 'government' it creates is by its nature 'govern-
ment by and with the consent of the governed.' "29 Because in many
deals the printed form is created by one party with intent to benefit that
party, the other party, who neither reads nor understands the printed
form, is not exercising that quintessential element of contract forma-
tion-volition, or true assent. Even if all non-drafting form-signers were
forced to read and understand the last scintilla of each printed clause,
the drafting party typically would be in a superior bargaining position.
This would enable him to dictate the terms of the private law to an
adhering party. This process does not deserve to be called contractual.
It is not democratic and, in a society based on mass production which
requires standardized forms even among competitors, it is essentially
unfair.30
28 C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977);
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co., 380 N.E.2d 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
29 Slawson, supra note 25, at 530.
30 Id at 530-31.
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Equally important is the necessity for a society espousing freedom
of contract to insist upon communication of the terms of the contract.
"[A] regime of contract could hardly function if the terms of an agree-
ment were affected by an uncommunicated intention of one of the par-
ties."31 The exercise of individual choice is necessary to maintain one of
the critical functions of social order: organization by reciprocity.3 2 It is
essential that courts establish effective rules for the operation of a society
with divergent objectives. 33 At the time of the drafting of the Restatement
Second, the courts had not met this challenge in the context of the
printed form.
The recognition of these and related problems long antedated the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The Uniform Commercial Code at-
tempts to address them. The revisers of the Restatement, therefore, were
forced to confront them. In evaluating the quality of their response, it is
important to consider the Code response that they were required to
reconcile.
I
CONTRACTS, AGREEMENTS AND BARGAINS
The attempt to reconcile the Llewellyn/Corbin views with the
classical approach appears throughout the Restatement Second The initial
effort is found in the sections defining "contract," "agreement," and
"bargain." The UCC defines "contract" in terms of effect-"the total
legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement ... (Com-
pare 'Agreement'). '34 The Code delineates the essence of contract in its
definition of "agreement": "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance. '3 5 This
fundamental concept of factual bargain underlies the philosophy of Ar-
ticle Two. Technical rules of classical contract law should not preclude
the recognition of this factual bargain.3 6 In terms of formation, courts
31 Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (November 19, 1957) (unpublished
paper), rtpdntedin H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law 421, 424 (1958) (unpublished manuscript).
32 Id
33 Id
34 U.C.C. § 1-201( 11).
35 U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
36 For examples of the anti-technical nature of Article Two, see U.C.C. § 2-204(3)
("Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefinite-
ness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for
giving an appropriate remedy."); id § 2-206, Comment 1 ("Formal technical rules as to ac-
ceptance, such as requiring that telegraphic offers be accepted by telegraphed acceptance,
etc., are rejected. . . ."); id § 2-209(l) ("An agreement modifying a contract within this Arti-
cle needs no consideration to be binding.'); id § 2-309(l) ("The time for shipment or delivery
or any other action under a contract if not provided in this Article or agreed upon shall be a
reasonable time.'). See also id § 1-102(1) ("This Act shall be liberally construed and applied
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shall recognize contracts made in any manner sufficient to show agree-
ment.37 Conduct is expressly recognized as a manifestation of agree-
ment.38 The difficulty or impossibility of determining the moment of
formation is irrelevant and missing terms will not preclude recognition
of a contract. 39 The Code standard, in effect, is indefiniteness be
damned, as long as two critical elements are present: a manifested in-
tention to make a contract and a reasonably certain basis from which a
court may afford a remedy. 4°
The Code expressly rejects the "plain meaning" rule of interpreta-
tion 41 and limits the parol evidence process to the preclusion of prior
understandings that certainly would have been included in the writing.4 2
It is not necessary to show that language is ambiguous as a condition
precedent to the admission of interpretation evidence (all language is
presumptively ambiguous) ,'4 and the principal thrust is to reach the
"true understanding" of the parties.44 These principles form a consis-
tent basis for the Code's treatment of printed forms in sections address-
ing the exchange of forms between merchants4 5 and the power of courts
to refuse to enforce some or all terms of a printed form on the ground of
unconscionability. 46 In effect, the Code gives effect to written evidence
of the deal containing those reasonable terms the parties would have
included had they thought about them, and will not give effect to any
terms the parties would not reasonably expect or terms to which assent
had not been freely given.
The Restatement Second steadfastly defines a contract in terms of
promises. 47 It recognizes the Code definition of contract as a "proper"
alternate definition, 48 but insists upon a distinction between "bargain"
and "agreement." "Bargain has a narrower meaning than agreement,
since it is applicable only to a particular class of agreements." 49 The
drafters felt compelled to make this distinction for two reasons: (1) the
recognition that there are agreements that contemplate no legal rela-
tions (e.g., the social agreement); and (2) the recognition that "con-
to promote its underlying purposes and policies."); id § 1-103 (allowing for the use of supple-
mentary general principles of law); id § 1-106, Comment 1 ("to negate the unduly narrow or
technical interpretation of some remedial provisions of prior legislation").
37 Id § 2-204(1).
38 Id
39 Id § 2-204(2)-(3).
40 Id § 2-204(3).
41 Id § 2-202, Comment 1.
42 Id, Comment 3.
43 Id, Comment 1.
44 Id, Comment 2.
45 Id § 2-207.
46 Id § 2-302.
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979).
48 Id § 1, Comment b.
49 Id § 3, Comment c.
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tracts" under the Restatement include promises that, absent a bargained-
for-exchange, are enforced on the basis of detrimental reliance, moral
obligation, and other bases. 50 Because the Code concentrates primarily
upon commercial deals, it can afford the narrower definition of contract
and can relegate promises enforced through reliance and the like to ex-
tra-Code law.5 '
Notwithstanding this necessary distinction, the Restatement Second
parallels the Code definition of "agreement" in that it recognizes some
forms of non-language manifestations of assent.52 The Restatement Second
first alludes to the problem of the standardized form, however, in a
Comment to the section defining "term."'53 The general rule that the
parties themselves will choose the terms is subject to limitations of pub-
lic policy, unconscionability, contra proferentem, and interpretations in
the public interest. Moreover, "in some circumstances terms in stan-
dardized agreements will not be enforced despite the adhering party's
manifestation of assent. .... ,,54 It is interesting to note that even at this
definitional stage, the basic problem of the binding effect of printed
terms is cast in terms of adherence. 55 "Adherence" by the disfavored
party (the non-drafting party) suggests that volition, the essential ingre-
dient of any agreement, is absent. The problem of adherence is not con-
fined to standardized agreements, however. Because it may very well
arise when each term of the arrangement is consciously adverted to and
at least superficially negotiated,5 6 the "contract of adhesion" may be
more appropriately considered in connection with unconscionability.57
Thus, in this early Comment as well as in the subsequent sections, persis-
tent confusion surrounds the issue of adherence and its relation to un-
conscionability and standardized agreements. This confusion is
explored in detail later in this Article.58
The comparison between the UCC and the Restatement Second to this
point reveals the startling failure of the Restatement Second to assimilate
the radical Code perspective. To the extent that the drafters expressly
or impliedly mention or deal with the Code at all, they take a parochial
50 See id §§ 82-90.
51 U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 1-201(3). See also Mercanti v. Persson, 160 Conn. 468, 280 A.2d 137
(1971); Jenkins & Boller Co. v. Schmidt Iron Works, Inc., 36 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 344 N.E.2d
275 (1976); Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979); Decatur
Coop. Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P.2d 323 (1976); Fairway Mach. Sales Co. v. Conti-
nental Motors Corp., 40 Mich. App. 270, 198 N.W.2d 757 (1972); Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v.
Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 230 N.W.2d 588 (1975); Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v.
Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1976).
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1979).
53 Id §5.
54 Id Reporter's Note.
55 Id
56 See id § 203; id, Comment f.
57 Id § 208.
58 See Part III infra.
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view consistent with classical contract law, or they view the Code as
though they were comparing our contract law and some foreign system.
The failure to recognize the search for the factual bargain at this defini-
tional stage does not augur well for an effective assimilation of the un-
derlying philosophy of Article Two in the Restatement Second. 59
II
STANDARDIZED FORMS AND FORMATION PROBLEMS
Where there is only one printed form allegedly evidencing the con-
tract, there may be a question whether any contract exists. Non-con-
tractual documents such as receipts, invoices, and parcel checks do not
qualify as evidence of a contract between the parties because the party
who is sought to be bound would not reasonably understand the docu-
ment to be contractual in nature. Misrepresenting a document as non-
contractual to a party who has no reasonable means of reading or un-
derstanding its terms should not be regarded as evidence that any con-
tract was formed. Even more obviously, physical duress vitiates even a
signed document purporting to bind the parties. More realistic and
common problems arise when the parties to the alleged contract ex-
change printed forms that resemble an offer and acceptance. Typically,
certain terms of the exchanged forms do not match, and the matching
acceptance (mirror image) rule of classical contract law precludes con-
tract formation. Because the exchange of forms with non-matching
terms arises in most deals between merchants, it was one of the more
important problems that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code
confronted in Article Two. Explorations of the Code analysis appear
elsewhere60 and are beyond the scope of this Article, except to the extent
that analysis of Code treatment of non-matching terms leads to a better
understanding of the Restatement Second's attempt to deal with the
problem.
The Code became effective in Pennsylvania in 1954; it was not until
a decade later, however, that the membership of the American Law In-
stitute completed the Restatement Second version of the non-matching ac-
ceptance solution. On the afternoon of Friday, May 22, 1964, the
Institute approved new section 59 of the Restatement Second, the counter-
59 For the underlying philosophy of Article Two, see Murray, The Article 2 PrLism. The
Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of/he Uniorm Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1981);
Murray, The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 OR. L. REv. 269
(1972). See also Murray, "Basis of/the Bargain':" Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 283 (1982); Murray, Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Another WordAbout Incip-
ient Unconscionability, 39 U. PIr. L. REV. 597 (1978).
60 See Murray, supra note 59, 39 U. Prr. L. REV.; Murray, Intention Over Terms: An
Exploration of UCC 2-207 and New Section 60, Restatement of Contracts, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 317
(1969); Taylor, U. C C Section 2-207." An Integration of LegalAbstractions and Transactional Reality,
46 CIN. L. REV. 419 (1977).
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part of section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code.6' The new sec-
tion was "based on former § 60," which reads as follows:
A reply to an offer, though purporting to accept it, which adds qualifi-
cations or requires performance of conditions, is not an acceptance
but is a counter-offer. 62
The Comment to former section 60 merely paraphrases the black letter
and emphasizes that a difference between the purported acceptance and
the offer turns the reply into a counter-offer.63 The preceding section,
former section 59, states the general principle that the "acceptance must
comply exactly with the requirements of the offer." 4 Certainly, the two
sections together may be viewed as stating the general principle of classi-
cal contract law that the acceptance must match exactly the terms of the
offer before the contract is formed. The Reporter characterized the
changes in these two sections as insignificant. With respect to former
section 60, his sole statement was the stark conclusion that "Section 60 is
substantially unchanged. '65 Of former section 59, which required the
acceptance to comply exactly with the offer, the Reporter stated that he
"left out the word 'exactly' on the representations of [his] Advisers and
the Council that adverbs are to be left to a minimum, and that 'exactly'
doesn't add anything to 'complying'. You either comply or you don't
comply. Otherwise,. . . there is no change in substance. '66
The new section 59, which replaces, but according to the Reporter
does not substantially change, former section 60, retains the same cap-
tion as the old section-"Purported Acceptance Which Adds Qualifica-
tions." The language of the section, however, is considerably different:
A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on
the offeror's assent to terms additional to or different from those of-
fered is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer. 67
The redraft paraphrases section 2-207(1) of the Code. The old section
focused upon a purported acceptance "which adds qualifications or re-
quires performance of conditions. ' 68 It is a statement of the classical
rule that a qualified or conditional acceptance is not an acceptance-it
is a counter-offer, because the offeree indicates expressly that he is un-
willing to make the exchange on the terms of the original offer. The
new section does not mention "qualifications" although there is a Coin-
61 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 342-43 (1964); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 59 (1979).
62 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 60 (1932).
63 Id, Comment a.
64 Id § 59 (emphasis added).
65 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 343 (1964).
66 Id
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59 (1979).
68 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 60 (1932).
1982]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ment reference to "[q]ualified acceptance. '69 On its face, the new sec-
tion denies the operative effect of acceptance to a reply that is conditioned
on the offeror's assent to additional or different terms. However, if there
are different or additional terms in the reply but the reply does not ex-
pressly condition acceptance on the offeror's assent to such terms, does
the reply form a contract? The first Comment to new section 59 answers
as follows: "[A] definite and seasonable expression of acceptance is oper-
ative despite the statement of additional or different terms if the accept-
ance is not made to depend on assent to the additional or different
terms. See. . .Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207(l)."7o If the addi-
tional or different terms do not preclude an operative acceptance be-
cause the acceptance is not made to depend upon the offeror's assent to
such terms, how are such terms to be viewed, £ e., do they become part of
the contract? The Comment answers: "The additional or different
terms are then to be construed as proposals for modification of the con-
tract," citing UCC section 2-207(2). 7 1 Further clarification of the new
section is found in Illustration 1, which is a modification of the first
Illustration to the old section. It is useful to compare them:
(Original): A makes an offer to B, and B in terms accepts but adds,
"Prompt acknowledgment must be made of receipt of
this letter." There is no contract, but a counter-offer. 72
(New): A makes an offer to B, and B in terms accepts but adds,
"This acceptance is not effective unless prompt acknowl-
edgment is made of receipt of this letter." There is no
contract, but a counter-offer. 73
The significant change in the new Illustration is the use of the ex-
press term of condition, "unless." This makes the acceptance depend
upon assent to the additional or different term and converts the pur-
ported acceptance into a counter-offer. Absent that express conditional
term, presumably the acceptance would be operative notwithstanding
the additional or different term. The Reporter's Note to new section 59
cited the famous case of Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. 74 as provid-
ing "a statement of the basic 'mirror image' rule."'75 Often used to intro-
duce law students to the "battle of the forms," Poe! is a classic example
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59, Comment a (1979).
70 Id U.C.C. § 2-207(l) reads as follows:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though
it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon,
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms.
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59, Comment a (1979).
72 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 60, Illustration 1 (1932).
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59, Illustration 1 (1979).
74 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915).
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59, Reporter's Note (1979).
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of how the unqualified application of the mirror image rule can work
injustice. It presents the realistic problem of a buyer attempting to ac-
cept a seller's offer through the use of a printed purchase order form. A
printed clause in the purchase order form is indistinguishable from Illus-
tration 1 in the original Restatement:
The acceptance of this order which in any event you must promptly
acknowledge will be considered by us as a guarantee on your part of
prompt delivery within the specified time.76
Upon receipt of the buyer's form, the seller obviously did not
bother to read this provision. It would have been the simplest of tasks
for the seller to have acknowledged this form. There was more than
ample time to send such an acknowledgment. The seller failed to do so
because, like the buyer, the seller reasonably believed that a contract
had been formed. When, months later, the buyer sought to repudiate
the arrangement, its first attempt was based upon an alleged lack of
authority in its agent, who had signed the purchase order form. As an
afterthought, it supplemented this flimsy argument with the claim that
there was no contract because the purchase order form contained terms
different from the terms of the offer, thereby violating the mirror image
rule. The court held for the buyer, stating that the buyer's form "speci-
fied that the order therein given was conditional upon the receipt of its
order being promptly acknowledged. '77 Yet there was no express term
of condition in the purported acceptance.
Would the Restatement Second regard the reply in Poe! as an accept-
ance notwithstanding the additional or different term? Because the Re-
porter's Note does not expressly reject the Poe! analysis, we cannot be
sure. On the other hand, it does not expressly adopt the Poe! result or
rationale; it merely suggests that Poel contains a "statement" of the mir-
ror image rule. A later Comment in the Reporter's Note, however, in-
serted during a subsequent revision, provides further evidence of the
Restatement Second view: "On the interplay of this rule [the mirror image
rule] with Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207, see Dorton v. Collins &
Aikman Corp .... -7" In Dorton,79 the seller used printed forms con-
taining provisions printed on the face of the forms, beginning with the
phrase: "The acceptance of your order is subject to all of the terms and
conditions on the face and reverse side hereof. . ".."0 One of the prin-
cipal questions confronting the court was whether this phrase converted
the seller's replies into counter-offers pursuant to the last proviso of sec-
tion 2-207(1)--"unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on as-
76 216 N.Y. at 317, 110 N.E. at 621.
77 Id at 318, 110 N.E. at 622 (emphasis omitted).
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59, Reporter's Note (1979).
79 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
80 Id at 1164.
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sent to the additional or different terms.""' Recognizing that the words
"subject to" suggested that the acceptances were to some extent condi-
tional, the court held that they were nevertheless not counter-offers:
"In order to fall within this proviso, it is not enough that an acceptance
is expressly conditional on additional or different terms; rather, an ac-
ceptance must be expressy conditional on the offeror's assent to those
terms."11
2
After citing Dorton, the Restatement Second Comment removes the last
scintilla of doubt about why Illustration 1 was changed: "Illustration 1
was Illustration 1 to former § 60, but is modified in the light of Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-207."83 Presumably, the new Illustration I re-
flects the influence of Dorton. Yet it is interesting to consider what the
effect would be of making a slight change in new Illustration 1. Illustra-
tion 1 finds a counter-offer when the purported acceptance contains a
statement like the following:
This acceptance is not effective unless prompt acknowledgment is
made of receipt of this letter.
Compare that to a paraphrase of the Dorton language:
This acceptance is subject to your prompt acknowledgment of receipt
of this letter.
New Illustration 1 placed great emphasis upon the term "unless." If
Dorton controls, the substitution of "subject to" for "unless" will be in-
sufficient to convert the purported acceptance into a counter offer. It is
difficult to believe that the Restatement Second suggests a return to an
archaic requirement that specific terms must be used to constitute a con-
dition. Any doubt on this score is immediately overcome by reference to
the new section captioned, "How an Event May Be Made a Condi-
tion."184 The first Comment to that section reaffirms the view that no
particular form of language is essential to make an event a condition:
"An intention to make a duty conditional may be manifested by the
general nature of an agreement, as well as by specific language. '85 Al-
81 U.C.C. § 2-207(l).
82 453 F.2d at 1168 (emphasis in original).
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59, Reporter's Note (1979).
84 "An event may be made a condition either by agreement of the parties or by a term
supplied by the court." Id § 226.
85 Id, Comment a:
By agreement of the paries. No particular form of language is necessary to make
an event a condition, although such words as "on condition that," "provided
that" and "if" are often used for this purpose. An intention to make a duty
conditional may be manifested by the general nature of an agreement, as well
as by specific language. Whether the parties have, by their agreement, made
an event a condition is determined by the process of interpretation. That
process is subject to the general rules that are contained in previous topics of
this Chapter. For example, as in other instances of interpretation, the pur-
pose of the parties is given great weight (§ 202(1)), and, in choosing between
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though this section is concerned with conditional duties rather than con-
ditional acceptances, unless a different and more than curious rule of
interpretation governs the latter, no specific language is required to con-
vert a purported acceptance into a counter-offer. Perhaps additional
light may be shed on section 59 by considering recent judicial interpre-
tations of UCC section 2-207(1). Such an analysis is reasonable, given
the reference to section 2-207(1) in Comment a to new section 59.86
In C Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v. Jordan International Co.,87 the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the following statement,
printed on the face of the seller's form:
Seller's acceptance is, however, expressly conditional on Buyer's assent
to the additional or different terms and conditions set forth below and
printed on the reverse side. If these terms and conditions are not ac-
ceptable, Buyer should notify seller at once.88
Relying heavily on Dorton, the Ioh court had no difficulty in construing
this provision as a counter-offer under the last proviso of section 2-
207(1). After sending this form, the seller shipped the goods, which the
buyer accepted and paid for. The court recognized that under the com-
mon law, as in the first Restatement, acceptance of the goods after receipt
of a counter-offer would constitute acceptance of the counter-offer. The
court rejected that result under section 2-207, however. It quoted that
portion of the Dorton opinion which states, without any Code or extra-
Code authority, that "when no contract is recognized under Subsection
2-207(1) . . .the entire transaction aborts at this point." 89 Such a view
is diametrically opposed to the Restatement Second language in a Com-
ment to section 39, which reiterates the usual view:
It is often said that a counter-offer is a rejection, and it does have the
same effect in terminating the offeree's power of acceptance. But in
other respects a counter-offer differs from a rejection. A counter-offer
must be capable of being accepted; it carries negotiations on rather
than breaking them off. The termination of the power of acceptance
by a counter-offer merely carries out the usual understanding of bar-
gainers that one proposal is dropped when another is taken under
consideration .... 90
Still another Comment to section 39 refers specifically to the type of
reasonable meanings, that meaning is generally preferred which operates
against the draftsman (§ 206). There are also some special standards of pref-
erence that are of particular applicability to conditions, and these are set out
in § 227.
86 See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
87 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977).
88 Id at 1230.
89 Id. at 1236 (citing Dorton v. Collins Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1166 (6th Cir.
1972)).
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39, Comment a (1979).
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counter-offer dealt with in section 59: "A common type of counter-offer
is the qualified or conditional acceptance, which purports to accept the
original offer but makes acceptnce expressly conditional on assent to ad-
ditional or different terms." 91 The Comment distinguishes such a true
counter-offer from a mere inquiry or request for different terms. The
conclusion is inescapable that the Restatement Second regards such an ex-
pressly conditional acceptance as a counter-offer, which creates a new
power of acceptance in the original offeror. The intention is to carry
negotiations forward rather than break them off. Thus, the whole trans-
action does not abort. Yet the Itoh court, following Dorton, felt compelled
to hold, contrary to the common-law rule, that the buyer's acceptance
and payment did not constitute acceptance of the counter-offer. There
was, however, a contract by conduct; after delivery of the goods, the
acceptance and payment by the purchaser created a contract recognized
under section 2-207(3). Under that subsection, the terms of such a con-
tract are those terms of the parties' forms that match. The terms that do
not match are excised and the gaps are filled by various provisions of
Article Two. As suggested elsewhere, 92 there is reason to believe that the
holding of Itoh with respect to the normal effect of counter-offers is pred-
icated upon an unarticulated sense that the buyer could not reasonably
have understood the seller's acknowledgment to constitute a counter-
offer, notwithstanding the expressly conditional language tracking the
last proviso of section 2-207(1). That view is further supported by an-
other section 2-207 case to which the Restatement Second refers in section
29, the counter-offer section.
In Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Manufacturing Co., 93 the seller's
acknowledgment of the buyer's order contained a conspicuous statement
conditioning acceptance on the buyer's accepting the conditions of sale
found on the reverse side of the printed form. Relying upon Itoh and
Dorton, the court reached the same conclusion-that the seller's printed
clause converted the purported acceptance into a counter-offer, but that
the buyer's acceptance of the goods did not constitute an acceptance of
the terms of the counter-offer. In support of its conclusion, however, the
Uniroyal court quoted from a commentary on this section 2-207 prob-
lem. To permit the offeree to include additional or different terms that
would be accepted by the seller's inaction "would allow the offeree...
almost unilaterally to reinstate the common-law rationale, for the hy-
pothesis of section 2-207 that businessmen do not read exchanged
printed forms assumes that the o ror-bu er would not learn of the term. ,,94
91 Id § 39, Comment b.
92 See Murray, supra note 59, 39 U. PrriT. L. REV. at 638.
93 380 N.E.2d 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
94 Id at 578 (citing R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3.06[4] (1977)) (emphasis added).
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This explanation provides a clear path to an understanding of the
otherwise convoluted rationales of Dorton and Itoh. Because business-
men do not read printed forms, they obviously do not read those parts of
the form that expressly condition acceptance on the buyer's assent to
any additional or different terms. Even if businessmen read such a
clause, it is doubtful that the typical, reasonable businessman would un-
derstand that such a phrase could turn an apparent acceptance into a
counter-offer. Students of the law spend many hours on the angular
phraseology of the last proviso of section 2-207(1) before they begin to
glimpse its intended meaning. To understand the intended effect of a
clause tracking that language requires considerable legal education.
Section 2-207 and the Restatement Second must permit parties to make
counter-offers; indeed, the last proviso of section 2-207(1) was designed
to permit this decision by any offeree. It is doubtful, however, that Karl
Llewellyn, the principal draftsman of Article Two, intended that any
printed form would be converted into a counter-offer by the use of the
magic language of the last proviso of section 2-207(1). The whole thrust
of section 2-207 is the prevention of the unfair "surprise and hardship"
that occurs under a mechanical application of the mirror image rule.95
If the offeree can win the battle of the forms merely by the insertion of
an "expressly conditional" clause, the purpose of section 2-207 is frus-
trated. The Uniroyal court recognized this possibility and sought to
avoid it. It is plausible to suggest that both the Dorton and Itoh courts
sought the same result; unfortunately, however, both chose to use a
"covert tool." 96 These courts failed to deal with the underlying problem
of the reasonable understanding of the offeror who receives the acknowl-
edgment containing the formula language of section 2-207(1). They felt
compelled to construe such a clause as converting the purported accept-
95 U.C.C. § 2-207, Official Comment 1 (as amended in 1966):
This section is intended to deal with two typical situations. The one is the
written confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally or
by informal correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or
both of the parties sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as
agreed upon and adding terms not discussed. The other situation is offer and
acceptance, in which a wire or letter expressed and intended as an acceptance
or the closing of an agreement adds further minor suggestions or proposals
such as "ship by Tuesday," "rush," "ship draft against bill of lading inspec-
tion allowed," or the like.
A frequent example of the second situation is the exchange of printed
purchase order and acceptance (sometimes called "acknowledgment") forms.
Because the forms are oriented to the thinking of the respective drafting par-
ties, the terms contained in them often do not correspond. Often the seller's
form contains terms different from or additional to those set forth in the
buyer's form. Nevertheless, the parties proceed with the transaction.
96 Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing 0. PRAUS-
NITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL
LAW (1937)) ("The net effect is unnecessary confusion and unpredictability, together with
inadequate remedy, and evil persisting that calls for remedy. Covert tools are never reliable
tools.').
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ance into a counter-offer simply and solely because it contained lan-
guage tracking the statutory proviso. Having taken this fatal step, they
found themselves with another problem. Dorton and Itoh impliedly as-
sume, and Uniroyal expressly admits, that the offeror will not read or
understand this clause. Therefore, it would be unfair to enforce the
seller's surprising and, perhaps, harsh terms against an offeror who
merely accepts and, perhaps, pays for the goods without assenting ex-
pressly to the additional or different terms. Negating the normal effect
of counter-offers-the acceptance of the goods and even payment by the
purchaser do not constitute acceptance-avoids this unfair possibility.
Rather, there is a contract by conduct under section 2-207(3) which, in
effect, eviscerates the seller's form with respect to any materially burden-
some term. The result is probably correct; the buyer and the seller prob-
ably thought that they had a closed deal when they exchanged their
forms. Only when a dispute develops do the parties make arguments
regarding the controlling form. Although the result is probably correct,
the analysis raises numerous problems, not the least of which is whether
the Restatement Second should be construed as approving this analysis.
One ramification that the Itoh court candidly addressed is the prob-
lem that arises if the seller simply does not ship the goods. 97 If the
seller's form contains the formula language and therefore must, under
the current judicial analysis, constitute a counter-offer, there is no con-
tract. It is unlikely that the buyer would assent expressly to the seller's
form, because the buyer probably assumes that there is a contract upon
receipt of the seller's form. When the buyer learns that the seller will
not ship the goods (for one of myriad reasons, but usually because it is in
the seller's economic interest not to ship at the price in the purchase
order and acknowledgment), the buyer is dismayed to discover that
what he reasonably assumed to be a contract-and perhaps relied
upon-is not a contract. This is the precise evil demonstrated by the
infamous case of Poe v. Brunswich-Balke-Collender Co., 98 the case analyzed
annually by thousands of law students to emphasize the deficiency of
the mirror image rule. Beyond this clear defect in the current analysis
of section 2-207, the broader question arises: Does section 2-207, as sug-
gested by these courts, significantly modify the normal operation of
counter-offers? Although nothing in section 2-207 suggests such a modi-
fication, courts interpret section 2-207(3) as mandating this change. 99
Does the Restatement Second acquiesce in this "exception" to counter-
offer principles? Language in the Comments to section 39 refutes any
such modification. Nothing in the Restatement Second "battle of the
97 C. Itoh & Co. (America) v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir. 1977).
98 216 N.Y. 316, 110 N.E. 619 (1915).
99 See C. Itoh & Co. (America) v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977); Uni-
royal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co.,380 N.E.2d 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
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forms" section requires this change. However, the Reporter's Note in
that section cites Dorton, and the Reporter's Note in section 39 cites Uni-
royal The Notes suggest that both citations are judicial elaborations of
section 2-207. The Notes do not indicate, however, whether the analyses
of these cases are reliable authorities or whether they should somehow
be reconciled with Restatement Second sections 39 and 59. These citations
raise still other difficult questions. Sections 39 and 59 were presented for
approval at the ALl Annual Meeting in 1964. During subsequent revi-
sion of the Reporter's Notes, cases such as Dorton and Uniroyal were ad-
ded. Although additional cases, particularly those citing or elaborating
the Restatement Second position, are often very useful, cases such as Dorton
and Uniroyal create ambiguities-those already suggested as well as
others. Quaere: if these (and other) section 2-207 cases had been avail-
able at the time that the drafters assembled these Restatement Second sec-
tions, would the black letter and the Comments read as they now do? In
1964, the case law and scholarship dealing with section 2-207 were in a
pre-embryonic state. Comment references to that section as well as to
other UCC sections were limited to the conventional wisdom (if any)
available at that time. The Reporter indicates clearly that there was no
intention to change the substance of either section 39 or section 59,
notwithstanding the Comment references to the problem of section 2-
207.100 Any changes were characterized as "stylistic" in 1964, and this
official ALI characterization continues to the present time. As suggested[
earlier, there can be no question that the change in section 59 was sub-
stantive. Although the change in the counter-offer section (section 39)
may be essentially stylistic, it does take a position on "expressly condi-
tional acceptances," regarding them as counter-offers with the normal
operation of counter-offers. Curiously, the only significant change in
section 39, as the Reporter emphasized in 1964,101 was the insistence
that a counter-offer is more than a mere rejection, that it contemplates
forward-looking negotiations. Again, this position contradicts judicial
interpretations of section 2-207, Le., that a counter-offer causes the trans-
action to abort. Because of the subsequent judicial developments in sec-
tion 2-207, some of which are cited in the Reporter's Notes, the guidance
that the Restatement Second provides in this extremely difficult and critical
set of problems involving the exchange of printed forms is thoroughly
unclear and, perhaps, counterproductive.
The drafters of section 59 knew that the substance of that section
was complicated by the "battle of the forms" phenomenon, yet there is
no reference to the problem of the printed form in this section. There is
not even a cross-reference to the section on standardized agreements
(section 211), nor is there any reference back to section 59 in the stan-
100 41 ALl PROCEEDINGs 329, 343 (1964).
101 Id at 329.
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dardized agreements section. The Reporter and the Advisers probably
had not yet consciously adverted to the standardized agreement prob-
lem at the time they were focusing upon section 59. The Poel case, how-
ever, which is cited as "a statement of the basic 'mirror image' rule
S. . "10 2 involved a printed form. It would have required little imagi-
nation to recognize that, to the extent courts require guidance beyond
section 2-207 in such cases, section 59 would be viewed as the new Re-
statement Second authority. Although the Code preempts in this area with
respect to contracts for the sale of goods, the massive use of printed
forms with non-matching terms in transactions not involving sale of
goods is undeniable; a purchasing agent is likely to use a purchase order
to buy services as well as goods, and the supplier of the services is just as
likely to respond with its printed form.
A related curiosity in new section 59 is the suggestion that addi-
tional or different terms in an otherwise definite expression of accept-
ance are to be treated as proposals for modification of the contract. 103
Code section 2-207(2) treats such terms as mere proposals only if the
transaction involves a nonmerchant.' 0 4 If parties to a contemplated
contract for services exchange forms and both are merchants, will addi-
tional or different terms in the offeree's definite expression of acceptance
be construed as mere proposals? If the Code applies analogously to such
a case, the terms become part of the contract, subject of course to the
exceptions in section 2-207(2). One of those exceptions, section 2-
207(2)(b), excises any terms in the offeree's reply that materially alter
the offer. Therefore, only immaterial terms become part of the contract
between merchants. On this basis, the failure to distinguish between
102 Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59, Reporter's Note (1979).
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59, Comment a (1979):
Qyia46ed acceptance. A qualified or conditional acceptance proposes an ex-
change different from that proposed by the original offeror. Such a proposal
is a counter-offer and ordinarily terminates the power of acceptance of the
original offeree. See §39. The effect of the qualification or condition is to
deprive the purported acceptance of effect. But a definite and seasonable ex-
pression of acceptance is operative despite the statement of additional or dif-
ferent terms if the acceptance is not made to depend on assent to the
additional or different terms. See §61; Uniform Commercial Code §2-207(1).
The additional or different terms are then to be construed as proposals for
modification of the contract. See Uniform Commercial Code §2-207(2).
Such proposals may sometimes be accepted by the silence of the original of-
feror. See §69.
104 Section 2-207(2) provides:
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract uness.-
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within
a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (emphasis added).
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merchants and nonmerchants in section 59 is arguably of little moment.
Yet, a given case may depend upon whether a new term is held to be
material. Another inference that arises from this failure to incorporate
section 2-207 distinctions is that the Restatement Second drafters intended
section 59 to apply only to transactions involving a nonmerchant and to
leave to the Code not only those transactions to which section 2-207
technically applies, but also those to which it applies analogously. No
sound reason exists, however, for so restricting the application of the
Restatement Second in this area, nor should it be so restricted, notwith-
standing the less-than-careful attention demonstrated by the Comment
to section 59.105
The number of cases raising the question of a purported acceptance
with additional or different terms when the document is not a printed
form will be infinitesimal when compared to those involving printed
forms. Courts currently manifest little difficulty with these questions
when the means of communication are not standardized, printed
forms.' 06 Indeed, that courts have so little difficulty in cases involving
letters and telegrams underscores the underlying problem that Restate-
ment Second section 59 and the judicial analyses of section 2-207 do not
recognize. Telegrams and mailgrams are usually brief and they carry an
inference of importance. Personal letters are not drafted in legalese and
are more likely to be read. The recipient of these kinds of communica-
tions will probably understand them, first, because he will read them,
and second, because he will attempt to understand them. The normal
operation of counter-offers works efficiently when the reply is unambigu-
ous, unequivocal, easily read, and understood. Consider the following
personal letter or similarly read response to a purchase order:
Thanks for your purchase order (90075 IA). Although we can deliver
the described goods when you want them and at the price you are
willing to pay, we cannot make a deal on your other terms. To ac-
commodate you, we make this counter-offer: we can only warrant
these goods for 6 months from the time they are delivered against
defects and we cannot provide a merchantability warranty or any
other kind. We can only be liable for defects in the goods for 6
months and we will repair or replace them if they are defective. We
cannot be held for any other losses. To further accommodate you, we
will ship the goods on these terms. If you do not want to accept them
on these terms, just reject them and we'll take them back at no ex-
pense to you. If you want the deal on these terms, keep the goods and
we will expect your payment within 30 days of delivery. Hope we
have been helpful.
This reply is received and the goods are then shipped. The buyer
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59, Comment a (1979).
106 See, e.g., Koehring Co. v. Glowacki, 77 Wis. 2d 497, 253 N.W.2d 65 (1977).
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accepts the goods. Would a Dorton, Itoh, or Uniroyal court hold the buyer
to the seller's terms under these facts? To hold that the terms of the
counter-offer do not bind the buyer under these facts runs counter to the
Code and to the Restatement Second Code section 2-206 permits accom-
modation shipments of different goods. 107 Nothing prohibits an accom-
modation shipment of goods sought by the purchaser on different terms.
If property is offered, the Restatement Second states, then "[a]n offeree who
does any act inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property
is bound in accordance with the offered terms unless they are manifestly
unreasonable."' 08 The counter-offer terms in the example are not mani-
festly unreasonable. Since the counter-offer manifests a willingness to
ship the goods as described in the buyer's offer, it is likely that the buyer
would be more willing to purchase the goods described in the counter-
offer than to purchase unordered goods. Therefore, there is no justifica-
tion in treating a counter-offer differently from a mere unsolicited offer.
If the current judicial analysis of section 2-207 were applied to this
counter-offer, it could be easily circumvented by an initial rejection of
the original offer followed shortly thereafter by an unsolicited, new offer
from the seller. This merely emphasizes the mechanical nature of the
current section 2-207 analysis when printed forms are used, and the
absurdity of that analysis when the form of the reply is such that the
terms are read and understood. In addition, current judicial analysis of
section 2-207 conflicts with the common rule of interpretation, recog-
nized by the Code and the Restatement Second, that separately negotiated
terms are more likely to be consciously considered by the party to whom
they are addressed.10 9 Therefore, they are given more weight than are
printed terms on a standardized form. All of these considerations point
to the same crucial question: When the documentary evidence of a con-
tract is a printed form, did the party against whom the form is to oper-
ate reasonably understand the meaning and consequences of that form?
The Restatement Second expressly addresses the question of the rea-
sonable understanding of the offeror but, curiously, does not do so in
either section 59 or 39. The Reporter confronted the question in revis-
ing section 58 of the first Restatement, which read as follows:
Necessity of Unequivocal Acceptance Acceptance must be unequivocal in
order to create a contract.1 0
The Reporter confessed that he "ran into quite a lot of trouble" with
this section."' Although his inclination was to leave the section alone,
the advisers and Council objected on the ground that "'unequivocal'
107 U.C.C. § 2-206(I)(b).
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(2) (1979).
109 Id § 203(d), Comment f.
110 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 58 (1932).
''' 41 ALl PROCEEDINGS 341 (1964).
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... doesn't say anything!"11 2 The Reporter tried again," 3 and the re-
sult is new section 57:
Efect of Equivocal Acceptance Where notification is essential to accept-
ance by promise, the offeror is not bound by an acceptance in equivo-
cal terms unless he reasonably understands it as an acceptance."14
Section 58 of the first Restatement clearly was designed to protect the
offeror where the acceptance was equivocal. The Comment to that sec-
tion states that the offeror is entitled to know, in clear terms, whether his
offer was accepted."15 Moreover, "[i]t is not enough that the words of a
reply justify a probable inference of assent."' 6 In Illustration 1, A offers
to buy goods from B who replies "that the order will receive his atten-
tion."" t7 There is no contract. New section 57 repeats the Comment
language of the original section and then adds: "But the circumstances
may make it proper to protect an offeror who acts on such an infer-
ence.""18 Illustration 1 to the new section is similar to the original Illus-
tration 1:
A gives an order for goods to B's traveling salesman, subject to ap-
proval by B at his home office. B sends a letter to A stating that the
order has been received and will receive B's attention. A promptly
sends a letter of revocation to B, which B receives before doing any-
thing further. There is no contract.' " 9
Illustration 2, however, reflects the additional thought in the new Com-
ment. The facts are the same as in Illustration 1, except that "A does
not revoke, but after two months, when it is too late for A to procure
substitute goods, B writes a letter to A stating that 'it is necessary to
cancel this order.' B has broken a contract with A."' 20
The Comment' 2' to section 57 makes the interesting observation
that this section is a specific application of section 20, which restates the
familiar rules on the effect of misunderstanding. 22 If both parties know
or neither party knows the meaning attached by the other, there is no
manifestation of mutual assent and no contract. However, if one party
112 Id at 341.
113 "After I tried to work on it, it seemed to me that it needed a qualification
anyway, where the offeror reasonably understands the communication to be
an acceptance. The general principle that you take ambiguities against the
person that created them would make an exception to the rule as stated in the
original, and so I put that in."
Id
114 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 57 (1979).
115 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 58, Comment a (1932).
116 Id
117 Id, Illustration 1.
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 57, Comment b (1979).
119 Id, Illustration 1.
120 Id, Illustration 2.
121 Id, Comment b.
122 Id § 20.
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neither knows nor should reasonably know the meaning attached by the
other, there is an operative manifestation of assent according to the
meaning attached by the first (unknowing) party. The application of
the equivocal acceptance situation is not difficult. If the offeree submits
an equivocal acceptance, the situation may be one in which the offeror
neither knows nor should know the meaning attached by the offeree; the
offeror may reasonably understand the reply to be an acceptance. By
applying the simple but workable test of the reasonable understanding
of the offeror, the problem of the equivocal acceptance is solved
efficiently.
Another relevant section is new section 61, which does not change
the black-letter language of its predecessor, original section 62.123 Sec-
tion 61 states the familiar rule that an acceptance containing a mere
request for additional or different terms is still an acceptance because
the offeree does not make the acceptance depend upon the offeror's as-
sent to different or additional terms. If the acceptance is made to de-
pend upon such terms, it is not an acceptance. The Reporter presented
this new section as unchanged from the old section. He mentioned that
the Comment was changed although he did not elaborate. 124 It is impor-
tant to consider this new Comment:
Interpretation of acceptance. An acceptance must be unequivocal. But
the mere inclusion of words requesting a modification of the proposed
terms does not prevent a purported acceptance from closing the con-
tract unless, iffairo' interpreted, the offeree's assent depends on the of-
feror's further acquiescence in the modification. See Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-207(l).125
The new Comment is important for several reasons. The drafters ex-
pressly recognized the connection between the problem that section 61
addresses and the problem of interpreting a response to an offer under
Code section 2-207(1). The language of section 61 contains a defect
identical to one found in the last proviso of section 2-207(1). Curiously
(although desirably), the defect is not repeated in Restatement Second sec-
tion 59, which addresses the section 2-207 problem directly. Under sec-
tion 61, an acceptance that merely requests new or different terms is still
an acceptance. An acceptance that is made to depend on assent to the
new or different terms is not an acceptance. Similarly, the last proviso
of section 2-207(1) indicates that an acceptance which is expressly con-
ditioned upon assent to new or different terms is not an acceptance.
Thus, both the Code proviso and section 61 create the same ambiguity
123 "Acceptance Which Requests Change of Terms. An acceptance which requests a
change or addition to the terms of the offer is not thereby invalidated unless the acceptance is
made to depend on an assent to the changed or added terms." Id. § 61.
124 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 343 (1964).
125 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 61, Comment a (1979) (emphasis added).
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in using the term "acceptance" where there will be no acceptance. 126
Section 59, on the other hand, uses the preferable term "reply,"'1 27
which immediately suggests the necessity of determining whether the
reply or response to the offer is or is not an acceptance. This may ap-
pear to be mere quibbling. Yet, one of the basic problems in current
judicial analyses of section 2-207(1) is the failure to recognize fully the
threshold question in these cases, ze., the proper interpretation of the
reply to the offer. Although the language of section 61 itself may be
criticized, the Comment provides considerable assistance. The phrase
"if fairly interpreted" emphasizes this vital point. To determine
whether a reply to an offer merely requests new or different terms or
whether it is conditional upon assent to such terms, new section 201, in
the Topic dealing with interpretation, is highly significant if the usual
rules of interpretation apply.
New section 201 is captioned "Whose Meaning Prevails."' 128 Like
section 57, it is expressly related to new section 20 on the effect of misun-
derstanding. 129 In essence, this interpretative section enforces the mean-
ing of a term attached to it by the party who neither knew nor had
reason to know of a different meaning if the other party had such knowl-
edge or reason to know. No reference to section 2-207 appears in the
Comments or Reporter's Note to section 201. Illustration 5, however, is
a classic "battle of the forms" problem. The Reporter's Note indicates it
is based upon a New York case' 30 that arose prior to the effective date of
the Code in New York, but the opinion explores the application of sec-
tion 2-207 as an aid in holding an additional term in the seller's pur-
ported acceptance inoperative. If a printed form reply can be "fairly
interpreted" as an acceptance by an offeror, a contract is formed.
Under new section 201, such a fair interpretation requires a court to
decide whose meaning prevails. If the offeror neither knows nor has rea-
son to know that the reply contains different or additional terms on
which the offeree intends to condition the acceptance, the offeror may
"fairly interpret" the reply as an acceptance.' 3' Therefore, in addition
to characterizing the reply as an equivocal acceptance that the offeror
may reasonably understand as an acceptance under section 57, it is es-
sential that the offeree's reply be fairly interpreted according to the di-
rections of section 201. Finally, assuming that a reasonable offeror
would not read or expect to discover a printed clause in a form reply
126 See Murray, supra note 60, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. at 327-28.
127 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59 (1979).
128 Id § 201.
129 Id, Reporter's Note.
130 Id, Comment d, Reporter's Note (citing In re Doughboy Indus., Inc. (Pantasote Co.),
17 A.D.2d 216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962).
131 Id § 201(2)(a) and (b).
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that otherwise appears to be a definite expression of acceptance, 3 2 the
offeror could properly be characterized as the party who neither knew
nor had reason to know that the reply was not an acceptance. In es-
sence, both sections 57 and 61, with appropriate assistance from section
201, lead to the same conclusion and analysis. Either approach supports
the basic proposition that the printed form must be tested according to
the reasonable understanding or fair interpretation of the offeror. With
both approaches suggesting the same underlying purpose, the analysis is
irresistible.
Interesting results follow from applying this analysis to new section
59, with the section 2-207 gloss suggested by the Comments and Re-
porter's Note. If the reply to an offer contains, in a printed form, the
expressly conditional language of the section 2-207(1) proviso, can it be
treated as an "equivocal acceptance" by the offeror which, if relied
upon, converts it into an absolute acceptance? An affirmative answer is
plausible. The offeror, again, does not read the proviso language in a
printed form response and may infer assent by the offeree. The offeror
should be able to treat such a response as an acceptance under new
section 59. Certainly, if the offeror reasonably understands such a reply
as an acceptance and relies thereon, section 57 binds the offeree to a
contract. If the reasonable offeror fairly interprets the reply as an ac-
ceptance, under section 61 it is an acceptance. This application of sec-
tions 57 and 61, however, contradicts the section 2-207 interpretations
discussed earlier, because those cases concentrate upon formula lan-
guage that is construed as counter-offer language as a matter of law.
This is precisely the deficiency of those judicial analyses. Rather than
concentrating on whether an offeror could reasonably understand or
fairly interpret a reply as an acceptance, they ignore the perception of
the offeror and fasten on what they perceive to be a mandatory con-
struction of language in the reply. If this language parrots the proviso
language of section 2-207(1), it conclusively manifests a counter-offer-
regardless of the reasonable understanding of the oferor. Under the Re-
statement Second, the effects of sections 57, 61, and 59 may be combined
into a workable principle applicable to the "battle of the forms" prob-
lem. The text of section 59 itself suggests an equivocal acceptance and a
need for fair interpretation. A reply that purports to accept an offer is
not an acceptance if it is conditional on the offeror's assent to additional
or different terms. If the offeror reasonably should have understood that
the offeror's assent to any new or different terms was a condition of the
acceptance, or if assent can be fairly interpreted as conditioned, the re-
ply is not an acceptance. Regardless of the printed formula clause, how-
ever, if the offeror reasonably understands or fairly interprets the reply
132 Id § 59, Comment a.
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to be an acceptance, he may treat it as an acceptance under this reading
of sections 57 and 61 as they qualify section 59.
There is no reason to suggest that the drafters considered any con-
nection between sections 57 and 59. Nothing in the sections, the Com-
ments, or the Illustrations indicates any conscious linkage. Yet, the
language of new section 57 may provide a simple and workable test for a
resolution of the dominant problem of the "battle of the forms." Al-
though there is an express reference to section 2-207 in the Comment to
section 61, it does not appear to be an intentional effort to remedy the
critical problem.1 33 Yet, it could provide still another effective solution
per se, or simply complement the section 57 analysis. A reply to an offer
that purports to accept it is either an acceptance or a counter-offer. The
only workable and fair test is whether the offeror reasonably understood
or fairly interpreted the reply as an acceptance or a counter-offer. This
is not the test currently applied by the recent interpretations of section
2-207(1); thus, an unjustified modification of pre-Code counter-offer
rules results. To apply the Restatement Second sections consistently, how-
ever, the fair interpretation of a reply that purports to be an acceptance,
although containing different or additional terms, must be controlled by
how the offeror reasonably understood that reply. The presence of some
formula language of condition in the printed form containing that reply
is irrelevant to this issue. Had the Restatement Second drafters concen-
trated on the test of the reasonable understanding and fair interpreta-
tion of the offeror, only rather casually inserted in new section 57,134 and
contained only in an unexplained Comment to section 61, they might
have provided great illumination for the diabolical "battle of the forms"
problem.
In summary, the Restatement Second section that attempts to incorpo-
rate section 2-207 of the UCC is not only of little utility, but is also
counterproductive. The inclusion of more recent interpretations of sec-
tion 2-207 in the Reporter's Note exacerbates the problem. The irrecon-
cilability of those interpretations regarding the effect of counter-offers
with the Restatement Second section on counter-offers furthers the confu-
sion. Whatever may have been said for the Restatement Second effort in
1964, by 1980 new section 59 needed more than mere stylistic changes.
The prolonged process of revising a major Restatement of the law sim-
ply did not permit modification at that late date. This is, indeed, unfor-
tunate for all who look to this Restatement for guidance in this
particularly difficult area.
133 Id § 61, Comment a.
134 See 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 341 (1964).
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III
STANDARDIZED AGREEMENTS AND UNCONSCIONABILITY
The original Restatement section 70 took the uncompromising posi-
tion that, absent fraud, duress, or mistake, one is bound by what one
signs or adopts as the written evidence of the contract although one is
ignorant of the terms of the writing or the proper interpretation of those
terms.135 The American Law Institute did not consider the problem of
binding a party to the printed terms of a standardized writing until
1970. When addressing section 211, the Reporter characterized it as "an
entirely new section, but it has a precedent of sorts in the original Re-
statement in Section 70 .... "136 The characterization of section 211 as
"entirely new" with only an attenuated relation to original section 70
evidences the great difficulty that the Reporter and his Advisers un-
doubtedly faced in attempting to deal with the reality of unread,
printed forms. At one end of the spectrum, there is the necessity of cer-
tainty and stability in viewing the adopted writing as the evidence of the
contract. At the other end of the spectrum is the nagging suspicion that
few if any contracting parties take the time or effort to read and under-
stand the printed provisions. The first problem was where to put this
new section. Should it be included with sections dealing with forma-
tion, sections discussing the effect of agreements, or sections concerned
with interpretation? Corbin did not like the placement of original sec-
tion 70 in the offer and acceptance portion. 137 Section 211 ended up in
the topic captioned EJect of Adoption of a Writing. 138 Although inserting
it in this part of the Restatement Second has some justification, considera-
ble difficulty arises in treating the problem in conjunction with the con-
cept of integration. Subsection (1) states the effect of assent to a
standardized writing as a manifestation of intention to view that writing
as a final (and perhaps complete) expression of the agreement of the
parties:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement
signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to be-
lieve that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of agree-
ments of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated
agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.'3 9
The drafters' intention in so designing the new section on standard-
ized agreements is revealed in the following statement by the Reporter:
"I stated first a rather reactionary proposition, which is subsection (1);
that is, that when you agree to a standard agreement, you agree to it,
135 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 70 (1932).
136 47 ALl PROCEEDINGS 524 (1970).
137 Id.
138 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Ch. 9, Topic 3.
139 Id § 211(1).
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and that means everything that's in it, subject, of course, to qualifying
terms."' 40 This is the sole reference to subsection (1) at the 1970 meet-
ing. If the intention was to bind a party to the terms of a standardized
writing to which he assented but did not read, that intention is faithful
to original section 70. Original section 70 had nothing to do with inte-
gration and, in light of the Reporter's explanation, new section 211 (1)
need not have referred to integration. The effect, however, goes well
beyond the Reporter's explanation. Not only is the assenting party
bound by the unread printed terms of the standardized writing; he is
also precluded from introducing evidence of prior agreements that are
inconsistent with the unread printed form. 141 Further, if the printed
form is a completely integrated writing, any prior agreements within its
scope are discharged.' 42 This may have been the intention of the draft-
ers, notwithstanding the Reporter's expression of a much more limited
intention. It seems odd, however, to be concerned with integration in a
section based upon the expressed and emphatic assumption that parties
who use standardized forms to manifest their agreements do not under-
stand or read the standard terms. 143 Thus, the central problem is not
whether section 211 treats the standardized writing as the final or com-
plete manifestation of agreement. The problem is whether all of the
printed terms are operative, and if not, what is the test to determine
whether one or more printed terms shall be inoperative? Under section
211, the assenting party is bound by all of the terms of the standardized
140 47 ALI PROCEEDINGS 524 (1970).
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210, Comment a (1979).
142 Id § 213. Section 213 provides:
§ 213. .EFFECT OF INTEGRATED AGREEMENT ON PRIOR AGREEMENTS (PA-
ROL EvIDENCE RULE).
(I) A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent
that it is inconsistent with them.
(2) A binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior agreements
to the extent that they are within its scope.
(3) An integrated agreement that is not binding or that is voidable and
avoided does not discharge a prior agreement. But an integrated agreement,
even though not binding, may be effective to render inoperative a term which
would have been part of the agreement if it had not been integrated.
143 Id § 211, Comment b provides:
Assent to unknown terms. A party who makes regular use of a standardized form
of agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even
to read the standard terms. One of the purposes of standardization is to elimi-
nate bargaining over details of individual transactions, and that purpose
would not be served if a substantial number of customers retained counsel
and reviewed the standard terms. Employees regularly using a form often
have only a limited understanding of its terms and limited authority to vary
them. Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the stan-
dard terms. They trust to the good faith of the party using the form and to
the tacit representation that like terms are being accepted regularly by others
similarly situated. But they understand that they are assenting to the terms
not read or not understood, subject to such limitations as the law may impose.
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form except as stated in subsection (3). In section 211(3) lies the test to
determine the operative effect of printed terms:
Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifest-
ing such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained
a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement. 144
The Comment to this subsection expressly recognizes that subsec-
tion 3 is a specific application of the rules governing the effect of misun-
derstanding in section 20 and the rules determining whose meaning
prevails in section 201.145 The express or implied relationship to sections
57, 6 1, and 59 are, therefore, even more firmly established. 14 6 The origi,
nal formulation bf section 211(3) is much closer to the language of sec-
tion 20:
Where the other party has reason to know that the party manifesting
such assent believes or assumes that the writing does not contain a
particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.14 7
The current and final version, however, requires the other party to have
''reason to believe" that the assenting party would not have manifested
such assent if he knew of the particular term. Professor Farnsworth sug-
gested his preference for the original formulation because he could con-
ceive of a situation in which that formulation would make a term
inoperative while the current version would bind the assenting party to
the term. 148 The responses to Professor Farnsworth's concern by the Re-
porter and Mr. Charles Willard, who was responsible for the new formu-
lation, are difficult to understand:
(1) Reporter:
(2) Mr. Willard:
As I read Mr. Willard's formulation, it doesn't
require the impossible showing of what the party
would have done if. What it requires is that the
stronger party, who submits the adhesion contract
or prepares the standard form, have reason to be-
lieve that the party would not assent if he knew
about this. I think it's an impossible burden of
proof to put on somebody that he would have re-
fused to sign if he had known about this. All this
requires is that there be reason to believe that
that's so. If so, the obvious remedy is to flag it in
some way.
I think the answer may be, sir, that many of us
have signed contracts containing provisions that
we wish weren't in there, but on balance we
144 Id § 211(3).
145 Id § 211, Comment f.
146 Section 201 should also be considered in part in relation to § 61 with respect to rules
of interpretation.
147 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237(3) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
148 47 ALl PROCEEDINGS 528 (1970).
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thought: All right, we want the contract, and we
have to take the good with the bad. And I want
to make it as clear as I can that when you get into
the area of unconscionability, then you are under
§ [208].149
The Reporter responded further by referring to a case involving a bank
signature card that contained a provision manifesting the signer's agree-
ment to waive a jury trial. 50 Recalling the holding of the court that the
clause was not unconscionable, the Reporter continued:
Whether it's unconscionable or not seems to me to depend on a whole
series of valuejudgments that I wasn't able to get enough certainty on
to include here, but I would hate to have that turn on the question
whether the party assumed that there was no such waiver. Assuming
it's a perfectly legible provision and it has not been concealed in any
way and he signs the card, and there it is, it seems to me the proper
thing to pay attention to is whether the clause is oppressive in some
way, and not this notion that it's unexpected at that point.
I think the same thing would go for the stop payment clause, that
most of the cases that threw out the stop payment disclaimer of liabil-
ity on the part of the bank did so on the direct ground that it either
was without consideration or it was against public policy, and not on
the ground that it hadn't been agreed to; and that's what I think
we're talking about here.15 1
These responses to Professor Farnsworth suggest a remarkable con-
fusion of thought. Evidently, the Reporter would not place the burden
on the apparently assenting party to prove that he would have refused
to sign if he had known about a particular term. Rather the test is that
the "stronger party," who submits the form, merely have reason to be-
lieve that the assenting party would not have agreed. If there is such
''reason to believe," the "stronger party" may remedy that situation; he
need only "flag" the particular term in some way. What kind of term
would the stronger party have reason to believe the other party would
not assent to? The answer is found in the Comment:
Reason to believe may be inferred from the fact that the term is bi-
zarre or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the non-standard
terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it eliminates the domi-
nant purpose of the transaction. The inference is reinforced if the
adhering party never had an opportunity to read the term, or if it is
illegible or otherwise hidden from view.1
5 2
A bizarre term may be viewed as a term that a reasonable party
would not expect to find in the standard form evidencing the agree-
149 Id at 528.
150 Id at 529.
151 Id
152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, Comment f (1979).
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ment. An oppressive term would also be unexpected. These examples
are reminiscent of the Comment language to the unconscionability sec-
tion of the UCC, section 2-302. The Restatement Second quotes this UCC
Comment in its unconscionability section, section 208: "The principle is
one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise."'' 53 The Re-
porter's response to Farnsworth also alludes to the "stronger party who
submits the adhesion contract." Again, the language suggests uncon-
scionability. Yet both the Reporter and Mr. Willard insist upon a dis-
tinction between the application of the standardized agreement section
(211) and the unconscionability section (208). The Reporter suggests a
distinction between a term that is oppressive and one that is unexpected.
If a term is perfectly legible, presumably it cannot be unexpected and,
therefore, one should not concentrate on whether "it hadn't been agreed
to," which is what section 211 is addressing. Rather, one should con-
centrate on whether it is "oppressive in some way," which is not within
the ambit of section 211. Similarly, Willard seems to assume that the
signer is consciously aware of the necessity "to take the good with the
bad" and, having signed with an awareness of the bad clause, is in "the
area of unconscionability." Yet, in delineating the kind of terms that
would raise an inference of "reason to believe" that the party manifest-
ing assent would not do so if he knew the writing contained a particular
term, the Comment to section 211(3) first mentions the "bizarre or op-
pressive" term. The other examples-a term that eviscerates the non-
standard terms explicitly agreed to, or a term that eliminates the domi-
nant purpose of the transactions '54 -are equally oppressive. All of these
examples suggest that the assenting party would be faced with material
risks beyond the scope of his expectations when he signed or adopted the
printed form as the evidence of the contract. Another portion of the
Comment language to section 211 emphasizes this explanation:
153 U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208,
Comment a (1979):
a. Scope. Like the obligation of good faith and fair dealing (§ 205), the policy
against unconscionable contracts or terms applies to a wide variety of types of
conduct. The determination that a contract or term is or is not unconsciona-
ble is made in the light of its setting, purpose and effect. Relevant factors
include weaknesses in the contracting process like those involved in more spe-
cific rules as to contractual capacity, fraud, and other invalidating causes; the
policy also overlaps with rules which render particular bargains or terms un-
enforceable on grounds of public policy. Policing against unconscionable
contracts or terms has sometimes been accomplished "by adverse construction
of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by deter-
minations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant pur-
pose of the contract." Uniform Commercial Code §2-302 Comment 1.
Particularly in the case of standardized agreements, the rule of this Section
permits the court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or
clause rather than to avoid unconscionable results by interpretation. Com-
pare §211.
154 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, Comment f (1979).
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Although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and
are bound by them without even appearing to know the standard
terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are be-
yond the range of reasonable expectation.' 55
This part of the Comment suggests a rather simple test to deter-
mine the operative effect of terms in the. printed form: one is not bound
by any printed term that is unknown and beyond the reasonable expec-
tation of the party who has apparently assented to the printed form as
evidence of the contract. However, both the Reporter and Mr. Willard
suggest that one may be bound by an oppressive term under section 211
if the term is "flagged" in some fashion, ie., if it is a "perfectly legible
provision" so that it should have come to the attention of the assenting
party who now must "take the good with the bad."1 56 These statements
suggest that an oppressive term may be enforceable, at least under sec-
tion 211. Any attempt to render them inoperative would have to be
considered under the unconscionability section (208), which is con-
cerned with "whether the clause is oppressive in some way, and not
whether it's unexpected at that point." 5 7 The views of the Reporter
and Mr. Willard merely indicate a kind of conspicuousness require-
ment-"a perfectly legible provision" that will satisfy the requirements
of section 211. Even in the Reporter's explanation, however, he begins
with characterizations of "the stronger party who submits the adhesion
contract .... ",158
The Comment to section 211 explaining subsection (3) is consistent
with this perplexing view. After setting forth the kinds of oppressive
terms that may give rise to an inference that the other party had "reason
to believe" that assent would not be forthcoming if the assenting party
knew of such terms in the printed form, the Comment concludes:
The inference is reinforced if the adhering party never had an oppor-
tunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or otherwise hidden from
view. 1
59
Suppose the "adhering party" had an opportunity to read the term
which was legible and not hidden from view. Would such a party then,
at least under section 211, be bound by such a term? The Comment
language does not require the term to be unknown, illegible, or otherwise
hidden from view to raise the inference of "reason to believe." Rather,
the inference is simply reinforced if one or more of these conditions is met.
According to the Comment language, the inference arises, ab initio, be-
cause the term is oppressive in some fashion. The failure of the Com-
155 Id
156 47 ALl PROCEEDINGS 528 (1970).
157 Id at 529.
158 Id at 528.
159 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, Comment f (1979).
1982]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ment language to distinguish between substantive oppression and
procedurally inconspicuous oppression is not remarkable in light of the
confusion manifested by the Reporter and by Mr. Willard, the propo-
nent of the draft of section 211(3). Moreover, the drafters need hardly
have added the last sentence of the Comment: "This rule is closely re-
lated to the policy against unconscionable terms. . .. ,,160 Unfortu-
nately, we are left with little guidance as to the precise distinction
between this rule and the policy against unconscionability.
At this point it is important to return to section 57 (equivocal ac-
ceptance), the Comment to section 61 ("fairly interpreted"), and the test
stated therein: if the offeror reasonably understands the reply to the
offer as an acceptance. As suggested earlier, section 211(3) is a specific
application of the general principles of section 20 and 201. Similarly,
section 57 is expressly presented as "a particular application of the gen-
eral principles stated in §20."161 The connection between section 20 and
sections 57, 201, and 211 is based on the concept of fault underlying
section 20. If both or neither of the parties know or have a reason to
know that they attach different meanings to the same manifestation,
there is no contract; the parties are equally at fault. However, if one
party either affirmatively knows or negligently should know the other's
meaning, and manifests apparent assent to the other's meaning while
intending to insist on a different meaning, there is a contract according
to the meaning attached by the unknowing, innocent party. 16 2 The
translation of this familiar rule into the equivocal acceptance situation is
relatively simple. The offeree who submits an equivocal acceptance is at
fault in the sense that the innocent offeror could view the reply to the
offer as an acceptance. The application of the same rule to determine
the operative effect of a term in a standardized form is equally simple.
If the party who submits the form knows or should know that the form
contains terms that will unfairly surprise the other party, the first party
is at fault and the form will have the normal and natural meaning that
the innocent party would reasonably expect in forms of that kind. The
"fair interpretation" command of section 61, in conjunction with the
interpretation rules of section 201, supports the same analysis. The "rea-
son to believe" test of section 211(3) is reconcilable with this analysis;
when the printed form contains an unfairly surprising term, the party
who submitted the form has "reason to believe" that the other party
would not have assented to that term if he knew or should have known
that the writing contained such a term. The critical question, however,
is whether a conspicuous term ("a perfectly legible provision") conclu-
sively establishes that the party submitting the form did not have any
160 Id
161 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 57, Comment b (1979).
162 Id § 20, Comment d.
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"reason to believe" the other party would not have assented to the term.
Is section 211 to be relegated to a test of procedural conspicuousness? It
is at least plausible to interpret the remarks of the Reporter and Mr.
Willard as suggesting that if the term is conspicuous, section 211 is satis-
fied and assent to even a bizarre or oppressive term is established.
Under this view, assent could be overcome only by a judicial determina-
tion that the term is unconscionable.
A similar problem is found in the warranty disclaimer provision of
the Code. Section 2-316(2) of the Code requires that a written dis-
claimer of the implied warranty of merchantability mention
"merchantability" and be conspicuous. The Code defines "conspicu-
ous" as a term or clause "so written that a reasonable person against
whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it.' ' 163 The purpose of sec-
tion 2-316 is expressed in Comment I to that section: "to protect a buyer
from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer .... ,,164
The particular requirements of the merchantability disclaimer are "safe-
guard[s]"' 65 designed to effectuate that purpose. These safeguards may
be viewed as a particular application of the principle of unconscionabil-
ity-"the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise .... "166 Even
if a printed clause disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability
meets the requirements of section 2-316(2), courts do not conclusively
presume that the party against whom the clause is to operate has as-
sented to that clause. With respect to consumers, courts have recognized
that the consumer may not have understood such a clause although it
meets the statutory formula. Thus, it may be deemed inoperative be-
cause it is unconscionable.' 67 In merchant transactions involving the
battle of the forms, a clause on the reverse side of the acknowledgment
form meeting the required formula sent in response to a purchase order
form will not be operative. The acknowledgment will be treated as a
definite expression of acceptance, and the disclaimer clause will be elim-
inated as a materially altering term under section 2-207(2)(b).168 Some
163 U.C.C. § 1-201(10).
164 Id § 2-316, Official Comment I provides:
This section is designed principally to deal with those frequent clauses in sales
contracts which seek to exclude "all warranties, express or implied." It seeks
to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer
by denying effect to such language when inconsistent with language of express
warranty and permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspic-
uous language or other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise.
165 Id § 2-316, Official Comment 3.
166 Id § 2-302, Official Comment 1.
167 See, e.g., Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 83 N.J. 320, 416 A.2d 394 (1980); Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc.
v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
168 In re John Thallon & Co., 396 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Old Albany Estates,
Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1979). But see Gilbert & Bennett
Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537 (D. Mass. 1977).
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courts currently recognize the need to consider whether a reasonable
party would have understood a particular provision in a printed form.
These courts will not necessarily find that such a party understood a
clause simply because it meets certain physically conspicuous
safeguards.
The inextricable relationship between the Restatement Second sections
on standardized agreements and unconscionability became reasonably
clear even during the discussion of these sections at the 1970 ALI Meet-
ing. The membership raised many questions and comments concerning
standardized forms during the discussion of the unconscionability sec-
tion (208). Consequently, Mr. Willard, the successful proponent of the
new draft of section 211, requested that the Reporter proceed directly to
a discussion of section 211 after discussing section 208 because "stan-
dardized contracts are more closely related to [unconscionability] than
they are to integration." 169 The Reporter was quick to agree "because
[211] does, obviously, tie in with [208]."170 The distinction Mr. Willard
and the Reporter would attempt to draw between the two sections was
not long in coming. A member of the institute, Judge Comford, sug-
gested the illustration of a case
where the court felt that from the experience of the average person
buying a home owner policy, he would expect to be covered on work-
men's compensation for people working for him, but where a close
reading of the contract revealed that the contract did not include that
coverage. The court said that the coverage was included in the con-
tract, if the contract would have been expected to include the
coverage.
MR. WILLARD: I agree entirely.
There is just one further thing I would like to say. Nothing in
here undercuts the unconscionability section. This [the standardized
agreement section] is talking about terms that a man just plain
doesn't know. They may be a little rough, but they fall short of un-
conscionability. If you get really unconscionable, then you fall back
on [211], and this [§ 208] is not material.
[REPORTER]: I agree with that. 17 1
Notwithstanding these and other efforts to distinguish the intended
scope of section 208 and section 211, the members of the Institute
pressed on. Mr. Charles T. Breeching, Jr. asked whether section 211(3)
would cover any situations not otherwise covered by the unconscionabil-
ity concept. Mr. Breeching explained: "It seems to me, particularly
from the comment, if you are inquiring primarily whether or not any
reasonable man would have expected the term to be either included or
169 47 ALl PROCEEDINGS 523 (1970).
170 Id at 524.
171 Id at 526-27.
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not, you are primarily talking about unconscionability."' 172 Mr. Willard
responded with an illustration concerning whether interest runs on a
note over a holiday, though the maturity of the note is suspended during
the holiday. He recalled a New York statute providing that, unless
otherwise agreed, interest would not run. To defeat the effect of the
statute, banks inserted a printed clause saying that interest should run.
Mr. Willard concluded: "There is no unconscionability, and this is the
kind of thing which I think my language was designed to take care
of.'1 73 The Reporter then referred to the case of an auction sale of real
estate subject to restrictions contained in certain pages of the real estate
records. The court felt that the restrictions that were sought to be incor-
porated by reference were not within "reason or precedent." They were
"unusual" restrictions and, since they were not "flagged," they were not
operative terms. 174 The Reporter conceded that "maybe that could
have been handled under unconscionability. . . ." In any event, he
concluded, "[t]hat's the sort of thing we have in mind here."' 75
Although the unconscionability section of the Restatement Second is
not limited to situations involving standardized forms, the Comments to
that section emphasize the use of the unconscionability concept in
printed form situations. The first Comment repeats the familiar UCC
narrative that courts in pre-UCC cases often policed against unconscion-
able bargains through adverse construction of the contract language,
manipulation of formation rules, or through ruling that particular
clauses were contrary to that ultimately ambiguous phenomenon, public
policy. 176 In emphasizing the importance of the new unconscionability
section, the Comment states that "[p]articularly in the case of standard-
ized agreements, the rule of this Section permits the court to pass di-
rectly on the unconscionability of the contract or clause rather than to
avoid unconscionable results by interpretation. Compare § 211." 177 Of
seven Illustrations to the unconscionability section, three expressly refer
to the use of a "standard printed form,"'178 and the remaining Illustra-
tions also appear to involve the use of a printed form. One of the Illus-
trations is based upon the well-known case of Williams v. Walker Thomas
Furniture Co. 179 In that case, Mrs. Williams signed a printed form con-
taining a clause permitting the seller to repossess all of the household
goods purchased from the seller. Mrs. Williams would not have reason-
172 Id at 532.
173 Id
174 Id at 533.
175 Id
176 See note 153 and accompanying text supra.
177 Id
178 Id, Illustrations 1, 2 & 6.
179 Id, Illustration 5 is based on Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
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ably expected such a clause in the printed form. She signed the form
upon purchasing the final item from the seller. In his discussion of this
Illustration, the Reporter referred to the contracts as "very complex and
intricate and, indeed, incomprehensible. ... 10 If the standards of
section 211(3) were applied to this Illustration, certainly the seller would
have "reason to believe" that Mrs. Williams would not have manifested
assent to this bizarre and oppressive term had she known of its presence
in the form. The statements of Mr. Willard and the Reporter tend to
indicate that the Reporter would have permitted the application of
either section to invalidate the add-on clause in the Williams Illustra-
tion. Mr. Willard, however, attempts to distinguish between the appli-
cability of the two sections. He seems to suggest two kinds of terms: (1)
those that are "a little rough" but not unconscionable, and (2) those that
are "really unconscionable." 18 1 He would apply section 211(3) to the
first kind of term to determine whether the seller had reason to believe
that Mrs. Williams would not have assented. Presumably, he would
suggest some kind of conspicuousness test. If the term were conspicuous,
he would, again under section 211, conclude that Mrs. Williams would
have to "take the good with the bad."' 8 2 A court could excise that
clause from the agreement only if the court determined that such a
clause is of the second type-in Willard's terminology "really uncon-
scionable." 183 While the Reporter seems more dubious about the clarity
of this distinction, his suggestions about "perfectly legible provisions"
and "flagging" certain clauses tend to support the same distinction.
The four Illustrations to section 211(3) are not particularly helpful.
Two deal with forms that attempt to incorporate other terms by refer-
ence. 184 A third deals with a contract for the sale of goods governed by
the Code and supplies no guidance as to the intended operation of the
subsection. 185 The remaining Illustration involves a printed form bid
that contains a limitation of liability clause in print which "cannot be
read without a magnifying glass."' 816 Not remarkably, the Illustration
concludes that the clause "is ineffective." Quaere, however, if a court
deemed such a clause unconscionable rather than violative of section
211, would it be committing a grievous error under the Restatement Second
classifications? Remember that the Williams Illustration in section 208
characterizes the litigated clause as "800 words in extremely fine
print. .... -187 Although the Restatement Second version of unconsciona-
180 47 ALI PROCEEDINGS 512 (1970).
181 Id at 527.
182 Id at 528.
183 Id at 527.
184 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, Illustrations 5-6 (1979).
185 Id, Illustration 8.
186 Id, Illustration 7.
187 Id § 208, Illustration 5.
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bility merely repeats some of the conventional wisdom developed under
the UCC to 1970, it does suggest that one of the factors that may con-
tribute to a finding of unconscionability is the inability of the weaker
party to the agreement to understand the language of the agreement. 8
Another relevant element would be a finding that the weaker party
"did not in fact assent or appear to assent to unfair terms."18 9 These
elements of unconscionability clearly intersect with similar or identical
elements in section 211.190
Other elements emphasized in the unconscionability section, how-
ever, form no part of the standardized agreement section. The black-
letter statement of unconscionability in section 208 suggests no elements.
In keeping with the Code version, it merely indicates what a court may
do once it finds that a clause or a contract is unconscionable. 191 The
1970 Comments to this Restatement section on unconscionability provide
preciously little more insight than the Code Comments, despite sixteen
years' experience under the Code at the time the Restatement section was
drafted. Beyond those suggestions repeated from the Code Comments,
the Restatement Second suggests only familiar factors and those already
mentioned. Thus, "gross disparity in the values exchanged may be an
important factor" in determining unconscionability in a given case.' 9 2
Similarly, "gross inequality of bargaining power" and terms that are
"unreasonably favorable to the stronger party . . . may show that the
weaker party had no meaningful choice."' 93 The stronger party may
believe that the weaker party will not be able to perform the contract.
Thus, in the Williams Illustration the seller probably knew that Mrs.
Williams would face great difficulty in making payments on a new
stereo set because she was separated from her husband and was support-
ing herself and seven children on only $218 per month. 194 The stronger
party may be aware that the weaker party is physically or mentally in-
firm or may suffer from ignorance or even illiteracy. 195 Curiously, an-
other Comment refers to the terms that are not enforced regardless of
the context of the transaction, such as unreasonably large liquidated
damages or limitations on the debtor's right to redeem collateral. These
188 Id, Comment d. See also id, Illustration 3 (buyer "literate only in Spanish" signs a
complex contract printed in English).
189 Id, Comment d.
190 Id § 211, Comment f.
191 Id § 208 provides:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remain-
der of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the ap-
plication of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
192 Id, Comment c.
193 Id, Comment d.
194 Id, Illustration 5.
195 Id, Comment d.
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terms are often statutorily unenforceable. 96 Yet, they differ in this
Comment from other terms that may be unconscionable in some con-
texts but not in others. 197 It is of particular importance to compare the
Restatement Second recitation of unconscionability factors with the stan-
dardized agreement section.
As suggested earlier, it is not difficult to find language in the Com-
ments to section 211 that could easily be inserted in the Comments to
section 208. There is one troublesome distinction, however, that must
be considered. Section 211(2) states that a standardized writing "is in-
terpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situ-
ated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the
standard terms of the writing."' 9 8 The ALI discussion of this subsection
is frugal. The Reporter merely thought of it "as part of the law of na-
ture. . that is that when you have a standardized agreement, one of
the things about it is that it's supposed to be standard, and treat every-
body the same way.'" 199 The standard is simply "the average member of
the community who is likely to use this kind of agreement. ' 200 This
immediately raises the question: Should one's education, experience, or
particular knowledge of the printed form be a factor in determining the
operative effect of one or more printed terms? In dealing with the
meaning of "reason to believe" in subsection (3),201 the Reporter em-
phasized that it is an objective standard requiring the exercise of reason-
able judgment in the light of the facts available to the party whose
"reason to believe" is at issue. If a seller submits a printed form to a
customer who is knowledgeable and sophisticated regarding such forms,
the seller may very well have reason to believe that such a customer is
aware of certain clauses in the form. If that customer assents with pre-
sumed knowledge of these clauses, the seller would then have reason to
believe that the buyer intended to assent to them. Yet, the Comment
attempting to explain section 211(2) states: "[C]ourts in construing and
applying a standardized contract seek to effectuate the reasonable ex-
pectations of the average member of the public who accepts it. The
result may be to give the advantage of a restrictive reading to some so-
phisticated customers who contracted with knowledge of an ambiguity
or dispute. '20 2
196 Id, Comment e.
197 Quteare. Are the drafters suggesting that unreasonably large liquidated damage clauses
or limitations on a debtor's right to redeem collateral are a species of unconscionability?
198 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(2) (1979).
199 47 ALI PROCEEDINGS 524 (1970).
200 Id at 524-25.
201 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1979) provides: "Where the
other party has reason to believe the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew
that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not a part of the agreement."
202 Id § 211, Comment e.
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Another obvious inconsistency is the repudiation of the principles
of sections 20 and 201. These principles would require that a party who
either knew or had reason to know the meaning of a particular term or
clause may not have the advantage of the meaning he asserts. Thus,
section 211(2) applies a test that cannot be reconciled with those sections
of the Restatement Second (20 and 201) ipon which the next subsection,
211(3), is expressly based.
In addition to the internal inconsistency evidenced by an objective
"reason to believe" test in section 211(3) and an equality of treatment
test in section 211(2), more confusion attends the attempt to reconcile
section 211 with section 208. A plausible application of these notions
under section 211 alone suggests a number of curious results. For exam-
ple, if a lawyer who drafts form agreements for suppliers of goods were,
as part of his practice, to sign such a form in his capacity as a customer,
arguably he would not be bound by any terms-that an average customer
would not expect to find in such a form. If a person with limited educa-
tion signed a form containing a substantively incomprehensible clause
(such as the Williams clause) that was physically conspicuous, such a
person would be bound by that clause. Section 208 considers factors
such as limited education, ignorance, and the like; a court may deem the
latter clause unconscionable if it created overall imbalance in the bar-
gaining process. Once the lawyer takes advantage of the "average con-
sumer" standard under section 211, however, it would turn section 208
on its head to allow the seller to enforce the printed term against the
lawyer. That the excision of the clause under section 211 is unconscion-
able to the seller under section 208 makes a fascinating argument. Such
a silly construction was certainly not intended in the assembly of section
211, and courts will not likely face that argument. The basic question
remains, however: How do courts reconcile sections 208 and 211 and
avoid these and other unintended effects?
An attempt to draft a highly effective section on unconscionability,
even with the advantage of case law and scholarly comment on the
Code section, was fraught with peril. It is extremely difficult to reduce
the elements of unconscionability to even a long, black-letter statement.
As the Reporter suggested, "Who knows what is 'unconscionable'? How
do you measure the length of the Chancellor's foot?" 20 3 The safe course
was to paraphrase the Code language, although the Reporter and others
knew it had provided no assistance to courts and lawyers. Apparently, it
was too risky to attempt any other kind of black-letter statement. Addi-
tional assistance might have been provided through the Comments but,
as we have seen, the Comments are of little further assistance. Had the
Reporter and Advisers not attempted a new section on standardized
203 47 ALl PROCEEDINGS 507 (1970).
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agreements, the new unconscionability section would probably have left
the users of the Restatement Second no worse off. The inclusion of the new
section on standardized agreements, however, increases the confusion
geometrically. The confusion is due principally to the failure to distin-
guish two basic aspects of unconscionability, unexpected terms and lack
of choice, both of which are directed toward a determination of the
quintessential element of any agreement: assent.
The first concept occurs frequently in agreements evidenced by
standardized, printed forms. When confronted with such purported
agreements, the Uniform Commercial Code, the Restatement Second, and
the courts recognize that parties do not read these printed forms. Faced
with this reality, courts must determine which of the unread printed
terms will be operative. There is no conscious or real assent to these
unread terms. Yet, printed forms are used and will continue to be used
without conscious adversion to certain terms; courts must have a worka-
ble test to determine their operative effect. The most comfortable test is
familiar. A classic statement of the purpose of contract law is to fulfill
the reasonable expectations of the parties to a contract.20 4 The mani-
fested intention of the parties determines the scope of the expectation
interest. In the context of a printed form, that manifestation of actual
assent or volition is typically limited to those "dickered" terms of the
deal that the parties consciously considered. These consciously adverted
terms form the foundation of the contract. A court may have to add
terms to fill gaps or subtract from the printed form terms that intefere
with the reasonable expectation of the party against whom they would
otherwise operate. In this way, the court prevents enlargement of the
risks of that party beyond his expectations. Section 211 best recognizes
this in a Comment which states that a party is "not bound to unknown
terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation. '20 5 A court
must determine what a particular party, in the context of the particular
transaction, reasonably expected beyond the "dickered" terms. Unread
terms in the form that are consistent with that expectation should be
operative; those that are inconsistent should be inoperative. The con-
spicuousness of the print as well as the character of the document should
be considered. Baggage and parcel checks, invoices delivered after the
contract is formed, and similar documents generally are not viewed as
contractual by the parties to whom they are submitted. Therefore,
courts have little difficulty in holding that any alleged contractual terms
in such documents are inoperative. Parties typically read telegrams,
204 See, e.g., Adams v. Waddell, 543 P.2d 215 (Alaska 1975) (per curiam); C &J Fertilizer,
Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975); Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc.
v. Beam Constr. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 397, 361 N.E.2d 999, 393 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1977). See also 1 A.
CORBIN, supra note 15, § 1; J. MURRAY, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d rev. ed.
1974).
205 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, Comment f (1979).
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mailgrams, and personal messages. Consequently, courts generally give
such communications operative effect. While conspicuousness of the
printed clause should be a factor, conspicuousness alone should not be
determinative of the operative effect of the printed clause. To the extent
that section 211 makes printed terms operative on the basis of conspicu-
ousness alone, that section is fatally flawed.
If a material, risk-shifting, and unexpected clause is in print so
small that no reasonable party could read it absent artificial assistance,
the court should excise it from the operative terms of the agreement for
that reason alone. To hold a party to such a clause would be oppressive.
The party would, obviously, be unfairly surprised because such a term
would not reasonably be expected. If a fair and expected term in the
printed form appears in equally small print, there is no reason not to
enforce it because the party probably would not have read it had the
print been legible. The drafter of a printed form should not include any
clause in extremely fine print because of the superficial appearance of
concealment, but if the term is not a material, risk-shifting, unexpected,
and therefore necessarily unfair term, it should be made operative. If
the term is material, unexpected and, therefore, excised from the opera-
tive terms, there is no harm in calling the term unconscionable. To the
extent that the concept of unconscionability is understood, it is equated
with unfair surprise, hardship, and oppression. This type of unconscion-
ability is based on the assumption that a reasonable party would not
have read or understood the term that the other party later seeks to
enforce. This analysis does not consider, however, whether the unknow-
ing party had any choice with respect to that term. He is not bound by
it simply and exclusively because he reasonably should not have seen it
or expected to be bound by it. He did not consciously assent to it, nor
should a court deem that he assented to it.
The second concept of unconscionability has nothing to do with
awareness of the terms of the contract. Assume the unusual situation of
the party who reads and understands every scintilla of the printed form.
He signs this document as the exclusive evidence of the deal. All courts
admit evidence of misrepresentation, fraud, or duress to vitiate this ap-
parent contract. Similarly, evidence of interference with the bargaining
process falling short of these startling possibilities will also permit a
court to refuse to enforce the contract or a part of the contract. The
party who requires goods or services important to his physical or eco-
nomic well-being may have little or no choice but apparently to assent
to the terms of a printed form dictated by the party with superior bar-
gaining power. Even where other sources of supply are available, there
may be conscious parallelism resulting in virtually identical printed
forms offered by all available suppliers. The phrase "contract of adhe-
sion" and the evil it suggests have been familiar for many years. The
1982]
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terms of these contracts do not surprise the weaker party because they
were read and understood-perhaps even explained by the dictatorial
supplier. Assent and volition and, therefore, agreement are absent. The
weaker party should not suffer the hardship that such clauses create.
For this type of unconscionability, that the clauses are printed on stan-
dard forms is irrelevant. Presumably, the clauses are as clearly under-
stood as they would be in the form of a personal letter or telegram. The
difficulties that courts must confront in determining whether a particu-
lar clause is oppressive can be enormous. For example, a court must
determine whether a party had any genuine choice, whether there was
gross disparity in bargaining power, and the like. The problems should
not be exacerbated, however, by confusing unconscionability because of
unexpected terms with unconscionability due to a lack of choice.
Either unexpected or no-choice unconscionability should make the term or
contract inoperative because of the lack of genuine or reasonably pre-
sumed assent. Yet, a clear distinction between the types of unconsciona-
bility would provide considerable assistance to those who must confront
the problem. Unfortunately, the Restatement Second, although sometimes
recognizing the concepts in myopic fashion, fails to provide the neces-
sary and desirable delineations.
In the context of standardized forms, most of the unconscionability
cases will involve the unexpected term, whether or not they also involve
the no-choice problem, because the printed forms are rarely read and un-
derstood. In the Williams case and virtually all other consumer cases,
there is little need to consider the no-choice variety of unconscionability;
undoubtedly the consumer has not read or understood the printed
terms. To hold such a consumer to a conspicuously printed clause that
the consumer could not understand is reprehensible. Even on these
facts, the question of choice does not arise. The courts may feel com-
pelled to deal with the "contract of adhesion" in these cases, but it is
probably an unnecessary analysis. In cases involving merchants, courts
interpret the Code concept of unconscionability as conclusively presum-
ing that the parties have read and understood printed forms. So-called
exceptions to this analysis typically involve parties who are merchants in
name only. Courts penetrate the superficial characterization and, in ef-
fect, treat the party as a consumer despite the commercial setting of the
agreement. Generally, such cases involve parties who would neither
read nor understand the printed terms of a document presented to them
by the large corporation with superior bargaining power.20 6 The as-
sumption that merchants read and understand the printed terms is typi-
cally false.20 7 The need for stability, certainty, and predictability in
206 See, e.g., Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
207 The author has conducted seminars involving over 5,000 purchasing agents and has
never discovered one who read or understood printed terms. Moreover, not one read or un-
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merchant-to-merchant transactions, however, prevents the use of the un-
expected term type of unconscionability by a merchant.20°  As to the no-
choice variety, if the argument is raised at all, the weaker party usually
has no evidence or insufficient evidence that he attempted to negotiate
with respect to the printed term that subsequently forms the basis of
litigation.20 9 If unconscionability is still in its formative stages, the doc-
trine is pre-embryonic with respect to merchant-to-merchant transac-
tions. In this regard, section 208 of the Restatement Second provides no
assistance. If courts eventually consider unconscionability of the "unex-
pected" type in merchant cases, subsection 211(2) may be a significant
problem. For the reasons suggested in the analysis, equality of treat-
ment regardless of superior knowledge is antithetical to current judicial
thinking in these cases. Thus, not only does the Restatement Second fail to
provide any illumination-it is, again, counterproductive.
IV
AN INTEGRATED ANALYSIS
It is at least doubtful that a separate section on standardized
printed forms in necessary or desirable. The current section suffers from
its caption, "Standardized Agreements"; the problems that it attempts
to confront concern the operative effect of certain printed clauses. It is
misleading to use the term "agreement," because the section is con-
cerned with the evidence of agreement rather than agreement itself.
The confusion is deepened by attaching the qualifying term "inte-
grated" to the section. The section is premised on the realistic assump-
tion that printed forms are not read or understood; thus, it is difficult to
conceive of an intention by the parties to regard such a writing as final
derstood the terms on his own purchase order form. Even people who are paid to read and
understand documents sometimes fail to do so. Justice Douglas reports a World War II story:
But even the great were bogged down in paperwork. Memoranda were
produced in greater numbers than bullets. They flooded the departments.
On one of my regular lunch dates with Forrestal, I said, "Why don't you write
a two-page memo and put in between the two sheets a half-dozen pages of the
same size containing excerpts from the Odyssey or Iliad?"
The next time I saw him, Forrestal was laughing when he told me that he
had done it and "the whole thing came back initialed by everyone, including
George Marshall."
W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975, at 277 (1980).
208 The seminal case in this area is K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303,
263 A.2d 390 (1970). Ste also W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 701, 543 P.2d 283
(1975); Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d 391,
381 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1976).
209 See generaly cases cited in note 208 supra; see also Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs
Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977), aj'dmem., 588 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1978). In Potomac
Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1974), the court
found no evidence to indicate that the buyer had attempted to negotiate the particular con-
tract provision that it alleged was unconscionable. However, this case was reversed and re-
manded without opinion, 527 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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or complete. More important, it is probably impossible to assemble a
new section that provides comprehensive and effective guidance with
respect to the standard-form phenomena as they appear throughout the
Restatement Second
A better course would have been to include a comprehensive treat-
ment of standard-form problems in all sections in which they arise. Cer-
tainly the section concerned with non-matching acceptances2 10 should
expressly consider the standard-form problem. Similarly, the unconscio-
nability section2 11 should deal with the problem comprehensively. In
that section, a clear delineation between the "unexpected" and "no-
choice" types of unconscionability would have been particularly useful
in relation to the proper judicial reaction to standard forms. Because
current interpretations of section 2-207 of the Code suggest modifica-
tions of the normal operation of counter-offers, there is a compelling
need to deal with that problem in the counter-offer section.2 12 Perhaps
even more important is the need to deal directly with the printed-form
problem in relation to equivocal acceptances 213 and those acceptances
that merely add requested terms or those purported acceptances that are
conditioned upon assent to additional terms.214 Relevant sections on
interpretation2 15 should include clear guidance with respect to the
printed form, either in the battle of the forms context or where the form
is the single document purporting to evidence the agreement between
the parties. The generic section dealing with the effect of misunder-
standing216 should also include express guidance concerning the opera-
tive effect on printed forms. Cross-references and distinctive
applications of these sections should be included in the Comments to
each of these sections. Finally, this pervasive effort should begin in the
definitional sections, particularly the section defining "term ' '2 l 7 as used
throughout the Restatement Second Although this Article may be said to
demonstrate these relationships from the Restatement Second itself, the
demonstration is possible in spite of the final draft rather than because
of it.
If a principle underlies the plethora of problems involving the stan-
dardized printed form, that principle is currently found scattered
throughout the Restatement Second As suggested earlier, the most impor-
tant statement in section 211 on standardized agreements is the state-
ment in the Comment that a party should not be bound "to unknown
210 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59 (1979).
211 Id § 208.
212 Id § 39.
213 Id § 57.
214 Id § 61.
215 Id §§ 200-203.
216 Id § 20.
217 Id § 5.
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terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation." 218, If only
one printed form serves as the evidence of the actual or purported assent
of the parties, the principle may be elaborated as follows: The parties
are bound by those terms in a printed form that they reasonably expect
that form to contain, regardless of what the form contains.219 They are
bound by terms not contained in the form if such terms are reasonably
expected; they are not bound by terms contained in the form if such
terms are not reasonably expected. If the transaction involves an ex-
change of forms, the threshold question, often overlooked in current ju-
dicial explorations of section 2-207, should be emphasized by the
Restatement Second.- Was the response to the offer a definite and seasona-
ble expression of acceptance or was it a counter-offer? One workable
test exists to decide this question, and it is available in the Restatement
Second Sections 57 and 61 state the test in a fashion which is indistin-
guishable from the test suggested in section 211 as outlined in the Com-
ment to that section. Under section 57, the test is whether the offeror
reasonably understood the reply as an acceptance. Under section 61,
the test is whether the reply is fairly interpreted as an acceptance.220
These tests must be superimposed on section 59 if that section is to work.
Section 59 determines if a reply that purports to be an acceptance is
indeed an acceptance by whether or not it is conditional on the offeror's
assent to different or additional terms. If the reply is conditional, it is a
counter-offer; if not, it is an acceptance. Yet, whether a reply is condi-
tional is itself a question of interpretation; the tests that must be used in
that interpretation process are the tests under sections 57 and 61:
Would the offeror reasonably understand or fairly interpret it as an ac-
ceptance, or would the offeror understand it as conditional on the of-
feror's assent to the additional or different terms in the reply?
Had this test been applied in current section 2-207 cases, the results
may not have changed but the analysis would have provided a sound
basis and high precedential value for further development. Moreover,
the current confusion surrounding the operation of counter-offers would
218 Id § 211, Comment f.
219 JUDGE CONFORD [N.J.]: I think I generally remember what you said, but
I'm not sure whether the formulation by Mr. Willard would cover both the
situations of the signing party or the assenting party assuming that a provi-
sion was in as well as an assumption that the assenting party assumed that a
provision was out. In other words, would it cover both? I think it should
cover both.
PROFESSOR BRAUCHER: I think I need Mr. Willard's help on this. I
think we mean to cover both, but I think the language does not quite cover
both.
MR. WILLARD: I think that's correct, Mr. Reporter, and if a form of words
can be found to say it both ways, that seems to me to be appropriate.
47 ALl PROCEEDINGS 526 (1970).
220 Again, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1932) provides guidance for fairly in-
terpreting the acceptance.
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have been avoided. Courts could use the underlying philosophy of sec-
tion 20 as the basis for the application of this analysis. An offeror is
entitled to a clear manifestation of acceptance as current section 57 and
its predecessor mandate. A printed form containing non-matching
terms is equivocal although it contains conditional language parroting
or paraphrasing statutory or other formula language, because the offeror
may reasonably understand the reply to be an acceptance. The offeree
has created the printed-form reply and either knows or has reason to
know that the offeror may reasonably understand the reply to be an
acceptance. Pursuant to the principle of section 20, the reply should
operate as an acceptance in accordance with the meaning attached by
the offeror-the party who neither knows nor has reason to know the
meaning attached by the offeree. The offeror is not "at fault," but the
offeree zL "at fault" in submitting an ambiguous, equivocal reply that a
reasonable party understands and fairly interprets as an acceptance.
The offeree can make a counter-offer, but whether a court views the
reply as a counter-offer depends upon whether the offeror reasonably
understands or fairly interprets it as such rather than a reply that closes
the deal. The underlying principle of section 20 is found in the single
printed-form analysis in the same fashion. The party who submits the
printed form knows that it will not be read or understood in all of its
printed parts. He therefore knows or has reason to know-"reason to
believe"-that a material, risk-shifting term will not reasonably be ex-
pected by the other party. The other party will not reasonably under-
stand that form to contain such a term. Because the other party is not
"at fault" in failing to read and understand each part of the printed
form, a court should excise the unexpected clause from the operative
effect of the factual bargain between the parties. The true understand-
ing or agreement of the parties should be that which the parties have
consciously considered, and that which they have not consciously ad-
verted to, but reasonably expect their agreement to contain. It is fair to
excise the unexpected term because the party "at fault" should not have
the advantage of a term that would unfairly surprise and oppress the
other party. Finally, a court should excise oppressive terms despite con-
scious consideration when it is apparent that the weaker party assented
only because he had no reasonable choice. These terms should be ex-
cised because they are unconscionable--oppressive and unfair-not be-
cause there is an element of surprise; they are substantively unfair even
though the weaker party was completely aware of their inclusion in the
printed form.
CONCLUSION
It would have been possible for the Restatement Second to provide a
complete structure for the development of effective and comprehensive
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judicial analyses of all problems related to the use of printed forms. As a
corollary, it would have been possible for the Restatement Second to pro-
vide a pristine analysis of unconscionability that would have been one of
the great contributions to contracts analysis in this century. It would
have been possible for the Restatement Second to expand the understand-
ing of the underlying purposes of Article Two of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, which may be summarily described as the search for the
factual bargain of the parties-i.e., "a more precise. . . identification of
the actual or presumed assent of the parties. ' 221 It is particularly frus-
trating to discover not only the seeds of an effective, integrated analysis
in the Restatement Second, but also some additional initiatives that could
have provided an uncommonly solid foundation for the acceptance of
such a comprehensive analysis.
In attempting to discover why the promise failed so badly, one
must reject out of hand certain superficial reasons. There was no dearth
of talent or imagination on the part of the Reporter and his Advisers.
There was no lack of support from the American Law Institute. There
was at the same time, however, no ornate tapestry of the new philoso-
phy of contract law simply waiting to be restated in classic form. The
challenges that the new drafters confronted were overwhelming. The
values of certainty and predictability had to be reduced in the unfolding
interests ofjust results. The lines of distinction had to be more wavering
and blurred. Generic principles of reasonableness, conscionability, good
faith, and practicability had to be substituted for more concrete and
specific rules that could play havoc with overriding values. The new
demands on contract law had barely begun to unfold when the new
Restatement process began. The necessary rejection of a monolithic and
dogmatic approach was always considerate of the classic tradition, at
least in terms of fundamental obeisance to it. The impossible reconcilia-
tion of myriad views created ambivalence in analytical clarity. A new
Restatement of Contracts had been started and it would be finished,
albeit more than a decade and a half later. All of these incredibly diffi-
cult tasks had to be accomplished within the process of the Institute,
which superimposed still additional layers of compromise on the efforts
of the Reporter and his Advisers. The presentation of the tentative
drafts to the membership occurred in an ambience of emerging concepts
of the new contract law with which the membership itself struggled in
their workaday efforts as lawyers, judges, and teachers. We find some
evidence of these emerging concepts as afterthoughts in the revised
Reporter's Notes. Unfortunately, these afterthoughts may make certain
sections and their Comments even less reliable and more inconsistent
than they were in preliminary draft form.
221 See Murray, supra note 59, 51 OR. L. REv. at 269, quoted in R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS
& J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 677 (1981).
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One is tempted to say that the Restatement Second was premature. It
was attempted before there was sufficient judicial and scholarly develop-
ment of these sometimes diabolically difficult issues. There was insuffi-
cient time for reflection, and there were insufficient bases for reflection.
One is tempted to suggest that now is the time for a new Restatement of
Contracts. Then again, perhaps we should wait another decade or
more.
